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INTRODUCTION

Jmagine a young woman, eight and one-half months pregnant with
er first child, experiencing labor pains. The young woman, Sarah
Mills, gets a ride to a local hospital, the only hospital within seventy-five miles of her home. After initial processing in the emergency room, she is sent to the labor and delivery unit, where the
staff doctor confirms that Mills is indeed in labor. Concluding that
Mills is poor and has no medical coverage, the doctor declines to
admit Mills and directs her to a university hospital in a city nearly
three hours away. When asked how Mills can get herself to the university hospital, the doctor shrugs his shoulders. Mills has no means
of transportation to the city hospital and delivers her baby at home.
The child suffocates during delivery because its umbilical cord is
wrapped around its neck.'
Mills is angry. She wants to sue for money damages for her
loss, and an injunction to ensure that the hospital and its staff do
not treat her and others like her similarly in the future. A federal
statute provides a theory of liability supporting this relief,2 and she
will likely have no difficulty convincing a federal court to entertain
her claim for damages.3
She will, however, meet substantial obstacles in getting the
injunction. In fact, she will probably stumble at the first step: under
the banner of "standing," the federal court is apt to dismiss her re1. This story derives, in large part, from a true controversy, Owens v. Nacogdoches
County Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
2. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(1988), prohibits a hospital from refusing medical care to patients who are not in a stable
medical condition.

3. See Owens, 741 F. Supp. at 1280 (awarding damages for failure of hospital to
comply with federal statutory requirements governing patients in active labor).
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quest for an injunction without reaching the merits or giving Mills
an opportunity to develop her case. In the cant of standing doctrine,
Mills may be out of court on her injunction claim because she lacks a
"personal stake in the outcome" of the claim.4
5
Sarah Mills is not alone; alleged victims of voter intimidation,
police brutality,6 unjustified body-cavity searches, 7 employment discrimination, s abortion clinic violence,' religious discrimination, 10 and
many others" have shared the difficulty of convincing federal courts
to open their doors to requests for forward-looking relief. The problem-which is not confined to disputes involving public entitiesderives in large part from the United States Supreme Court's precedent on standing, reinterpreted and expanded in the Court's decision in City of Los Angeles v.Lyons. 2
In Lyons, Los Angeles police choked to unconsciousness an individual stopped for a minor traffic violation. The plaintiff, Adolph
Lyons, alleged the existence of a police department policy of applying unnecessary, life-threatening chokeholds and sought damages as
well as injunctive and declaratory relief. 3 Ruling only on Lyons' request for an injunction, the United States Supreme Court held that
Lyons lacked Article I standing 4 to seek injunctive relief against
4. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (holding that plaintiffs must
demonstrate "a personal stake in the outcome" in order to assure "concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues" necessary for the proper resolution of constitutional questions).
5. See, e.g., Smith v. Meese, 821 F.2d 1484, 1494-96 (11th Cir. 1987) (reversing district court's determination that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge voter' intimidation
practices by government officials).
6. Curtis v. City of New Haven, 726 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that the plaintiff
had no standing to challenge police use of mace).
7. Jones v. Bowman, 664 F. Supp. 433, 433-34 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (concluding that
plaintiffhad no standing to challenge strip searches of women performed at county jail).
8. See, e.g., Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 857 (7th Cir. 1989) (asserting that a fired
employee had no standing to sue former employer for injunction against firing policies).
9. See, e.g., Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 865 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing district court's determination that abortion clinics had no standing to seek injunction
against anti-abortion protestors).
10. Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 959 F.2d 1283, 1285-86 (5th Cir.)
(holding that a prospective juror imprisoned for contempt because she refused on religious grounds to take oath does not have standing to seek forward-looking relief), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 191 (1992).
11. For a discussion of the various circumstances in which federal courts have raised
substantial threshold barriers to injunctive relief, see infra notes 51-52, 70 and accompanying text.
12. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
13. Id. at 97-98. Lyons alleged that the policy threatened rights protected under the First,
Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 98.
14. Standing derives from Article IIls restriction of the federal judicial power to
cases and controversies. Standing doctrine, however, also includes "prudential" requirements, which derive from principles of prudent judicial administration. See ERWIN
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the chokehold policy. Lyons lacked standing, said the Court, because
he had failed to show that the threat of future injury to him was
"real and immediate," rather than "conjectural" or "hypothetical.""5
For that reason, the Court concluded that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over Lyons' injunction request.
The Lyons Court added that, even if Lyons had established
standing, equitable principles required the dismissal of Lyons' injunction claim because he had not shown that he would personally
suffer from another improper chokehold.1' According to the Court,
Lyons' request for equitable relief failed to demonstrate a "likelihood
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury."17 The immediate
threat of injury requirement thus served as a double-barreled
weapon, acting as both a jurisdictional and a remedial obstacle.
The doctrine emerging from Lyons is only one of many mechanisms used by federal courts to avoid difficult and sensitive questions on the merits of a case. The rule of Lyons, however, is particularly treacherous. It is not only a seemingly neutral procedural instrument for crafting a desired substantive outcome, but it also
terminates litigation before the true nature of the dispute has come
to full view. Unfettered by the consequences of publicity, the Lyons
approach is capable of barring plaintiffs like Sarah Mills from even
the opportunity to seek relief.'8
In addition to its harsh practical results, Lyons has also confounded lower courts. Inconsistent lower court holdings in the wake
of Lyons have prompted at least two Supreme Court Justices to call
for a reexamination of the issues presented in the case.1" In particuCHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 51-52 (1989). The Lyons Court premised its ruling

on Article III. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101, 109.
15. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, 105-06.
16. Id. at 111. The Court further ruled that comity and deference to law enforcement
officers required dismissal of the injunction request. Id. at 112.
17. Id. at I11 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).
18. Commentators have overwhelmingly condemned the Lyons decision. See, e.g.,
MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 95 (1991); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 99-120 (1985); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justicia.
bility, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudenceof Lyons, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984); Linda E. Fisher, Caging Lyons: The Availability of Injunctive
Relief in Section 1983 Actions, 18 LOY. U. CH. L.J. 1085, 1085 (1987); Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 100-01 (1984); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor
of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1374-75 (1988);
Developments, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Standing to Seek Equitable Relief, 97
HARV. L. REV. 215, 215-24 (1983); Ronald T. Gerwatowski, Note, Standing and Injunctions: The Demise of Public Law Litigation and Other Effects of Lyons, 25 B.C. L. REV.
765 (1984).
19. In denying the petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Court noted that Justices White and Marshall "would grant certiorari,"
Richardson v. City of Chicago, 493 U.S. 1035, 1035 (1990).
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lar, the lower courts have disagreed on whether Lyons requires
plaintiffs to establish standing for each type of relief requested. °
Most lower courts have concluded that Lyons requires separate
standing for each type of requested relief, a conclusion most consistent with the language of Lyons.
In this Article, I begin by tracing the evolution of Lyons and examining the decision in detail. After evaluating how lower courts
have interpreted Lyons, I next turn-in Part II-to the Article's first
major argument. In particular, I posit that the Lyons Court was illadvised to suggest that federal courts must undertake a separate
"standing" inquiry for each type of remedy sought in a case.
Threshold questions about whether a controversy is sufficiently concrete to justify federal court jurisdiction should be analytically distinct from issues bearing on whether a particular remedy is appropriate in a case.
Part H of this Article demonstrates that the Court's collapse of
the standing and remedial inquiries is particularly inappropriate for
permanent injunctive relief. As the structure and text of Lyons itself
illustrates, equitable doctrine already in place is useful in analyzing
whether the threat of harm is sufficiently ripe to justify issuing an
injunction. Contrary to Lyons, however, a court should invoke this
equitable doctrine-known as imminence or equitable ripeness21 after the parties have developed a factual record. Only after the
facts have unfolded can a court intelligently weigh the potential
threat of harm in light of other factors bearing on whether an injunction is the most effective and appropriate remedy.2
At the end of Part 11, I reinforce this reasoning with a detailed
study of the values that motivate and explain standing doctrine. I
conclude that the Lyons methodology is neither necessary nor appropriate to satisfying these values.
20. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text for further discussion of the split
among the courts of appeals on the meaning of Lyons.
21. Although "imminence" is the more common name for the doctrine, I use
"equitable ripeness" throughout the remainder of this Article. As explained further in
notes 209-10 and accompanying text, the doctrine actually includes both an imminence
component and a probability component. For that reason, equitable ripeness is a more accurate moniker.
22. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 131 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissent-

ing) ("[Ilt will be rarely easy to decide with any certainty at the outset of a lawsuit that no
equitable relief would be appropriate under any conceivable set of facts .... ."); Fallon, supra note 18, at 75 (noting that Lyons' remedial standing "precludes a federal court from
obtaining relevant information concerning the appropriateness and desirability of adjudication"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1273 (1989) (arguing that the Lyons Court
terminated the dispute before anyone was able to ascertain the scope of the police department policy or the terms of permanent injunctive relief the district court would impose).
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Part III explores the role-if any-that remedial concerns
should play in determining whether an injunction plaintiff has
stand#ig to sue. To study this issue, I examine two general categories of plaintiffs: those who fear future injury similar to that they
have already suffered and those who have no past injury but nonetheless fear prospective harm. On final analysis, it appears that remedial concerns have little relevance to standing analysis for either
category of litigants.
Finally, in Part IV, I shift my focus to the remedial phase of
litigation and canvass equitable principles governing permanent
injunctions. This Part advocates reconsidering traditional principles
governing the equitable ripeness doctrine, which restricts injunctive
relief to circumstances where threatened harm is both immediate
and practically certain to occur. Drawing on social science and historical materials, I conclude that-while equity's concern with the
imminence and probability of harm is appropriate--courts are best
advised to avoid giving the concern undue weight in deciding
whether to issue an injunction.
I. THE THREADS OF THE LYONS DOCTRmINE
Standing is, of course, only one of several doctrines designed to
limit federal court jurisdiction to questions "presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process." Other justiciability doctrines
such as mootness and ripeness, deriving from Article IIrs case and
controversy limitation, seek to ensure that courts respond only to
suits by individuals whose personal interests are at stake.2 4 Indeed,
the justiciability doctrines share common purposes and each can be
recast in terms of another.5
23. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 115 (1962) (asserting that the standing and case and controversy requirements are designed to ensure that the "judgment of courts may be had in concrete
cases that exemplify the actual consequences of legislative or executive actions").
24. Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy"Requirement,93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 321 (1979); see, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 154-55 (1987) (positing that the
justiciability doctrines "ensure the 'properly limited role' of the unelected federal judiciary.. . ." (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))).
25. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability,22 CONN. L. REV. 677,
678 (1990) (arguing that a "daunting" set ofjusticiability rules is unnecessary because "all
of the doctrines are animated by a few basic policy questions"); see also Susan Bandes,
The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 229 (1990) (asserting that "underlying the various justiciability and joinder doctrines is a common question of constitutional interpretation: the idea of a case"). But cf Fallon, supra note 18, at 26 (maintaining that while
mootness and standing "serve similar functions," there are "important differences between the doctrines").
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Nothing mandates, therefore, that a court analyze the jurisdictional implications of an injunction request under the rubric of
standing. In fact, courts have also invoked the doctrines of ripeness
and mootness to analyze questions of immediate and concrete
threats of injury."6 Nevertheless, in recent Supreme Court cases
such as Lyons, standing-the issue of who is the proper party to
bring the suit-has served as the primary jurisdictional vehicle for
analyzing threats of injury.' Although the meaning of Lyons and its
antecedents has divided lower federal courts, these courts have
nearly unanimously followed the Supreme Court's choice of standing
doctrine to analyze injunction requests.2
A.

Spinning the Yarn: Evolution of Lyons

The Lyons Court's approach to requests for prospective relief
owes its legacy to two earlier public law disputes, O'Shea v. Littleton29 and Rizzo v. Goode.0 Like Lyons, O'Shea and Rizzo challenged
law enforcement practices.3 1 In both cases, the Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs' requests for injunctive relief, finding that the
plaintiffs lacked the Article HI requirement of a "real and immediate" threatened injury. 2
Both cases also rested in part on equitable principles, including
a deep concern for the intrusive effect of federal injunctive relief on
state law enforcement efforts. 3 It was O'Shea, however, that articulated the doctrinal twist that has proved so troublesome for plaintiffs in both private and public law disputes. Specifically, O'Shea
clarified that the requirement of a real and immediate threat of injury serves as both a jurisdictional and remedial barrier.3 By its
analysis, the O'Shea Court showed that the requirement was coex26. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
622 (1986) (ripeness); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458-60 (1974) (ripeness); Jarvis
v. Regan, 833 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1987) (mootness); Owens v. Nacogdoches County
Hosp. Dist., 741 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (mootness).
27. In O'Shea v. Littleton, an antecedent to Lyons, the Court did not speak in terms
of any specific justiciability doctrine, but instead held only that the plaintiffs failed to establish a case or controversy. 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974).
28. See infra notes 52-53 and 60-61 for a discussion of cases using standing to analyze injunction requests, but disagreeing over the meaning of Lyons.
29. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
30. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
31. O'Shea challenged a practice of racially discriminatory bond setting, sentencing,
and assessing ofjury trial fees. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 491-92. In Rizzo, the plaintiffs alleged
a pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional police mistreatment of minority
citizens. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 366-67.
32. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372-73; O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494-97.
33. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377-80; O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 499-502.
34. O'Shea,414 U.S. at 498-500.
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tensive in both contexts.3 5
Applying the real and immediate threat of injury requirement
in Lyons, the Court ensured that it could preclude federal court review of a wide array of cases. In fact, the Lyons Court seemed to require that a plaintiff invoking a federal court's power to issue an
demonstrate that the threat of injury was almost a cerinjunction
36
tainty.
The facts in Lyons bring home the severity of the threat of injury requirement. Adolph Lyons, a black male, was pulled over for
driving with a burned out tail light. Officers with drawn revolvers
instructed him to face his car and spread his legs. He was then ordered to place his clasped hands on top of his head. One officer did a
patdown, revealing no weapons. Lyons then lowered his hands, but
the officers slammed them back onto his head. When he complained
of the pain,
[w]ithin five to ten seconds, the officer began to choke Lyons by applying a
forearm against his throat. As Lyons struggled for air, the officer handcuffed him but continued to apply the chokehold until Lyons blacked out.

When Lyons regained consciousness, he was lying face down on the

ground, choking, gasping for air, and spitting up blood and dirt. He3 7 had
urinated and defecated. He was issued a traffic citation and released.
Although Lyons was given little opportunity to develop a record
in the case, he established that Los Angeles police officers had applied chokeholds on at least 975 occasions in the five-year period before his incident.38 In that period, at least 16 of the persons subjected
to such chokeholds-twelve of them black males like Lyons-had
died. 9 The parties did not dispute that Los Angeles instructed its
officers that chokeholds were less than deadly force. Nor did any of
35. Following its jurisdictional analysis, the O'Shea Court analyzed the equitable
constraints on injunctive relief. In discussing whether the injury was sufficiently real and
immediate to satisfy equitable requirements, the O'Shea Court asserted that it had already disposed of the requirement in its earlier jurisdictional discussion: "We have already canvassed the necessarily conjectural nature of the threatened injury." Id. at 502.
36. See TRIBE, supra note 18, at 101-02 ("[T]he Court demanded that Lyons show,
apparently to a certainty, that he would again be choked without provocation or that the
city had ordered or authorized that he be."); Fisher, supra note 18, at 1097 (arguing that
the Lyons test "requires a virtual certainty of future injury"). But see Fisher, supra note
18, at 1100 (suggesting that the language in Lyons "should be narrowly construed to
require only a reasonable likelihood of recurrence [of injury], instead of a virtual certainty
of recurrence" in order to reconcile the decision with prior case law).
37. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, Justice Marshall described this version of the facts in Lyons which he contended was based
upon "uncontradicted evidence in the record." City of Los Ageles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
114-15 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the parties doubt that chokeholds pose a high risk of serious injury
or death. 0 The dissent observed that the policy of the City of Los
Angeles permitted the use of chokeholds in a variety of instances,
including a situation where, although the suspect is resisting
arrest,
41
the officer is not threatened with serious bodily injury.
Notwithstanding Lyons' showings, the Supreme Court concluded that he fell "far short of the allegations" necessary for standing to seek an injunction. 42 The Court explained that, in order to
establish an actual controversy in the case, Lyons would have had
"to allege that he would have another encounter with the police."43
In addition, Lyons would have had "to make the incredible assertion
either (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any
citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter.., or (2) that
the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner.,,44
Turning to the equitable constraints on Lyons' request for an
injunction, 45 the Court reiterated the "speculative nature of Lyons'
claim of future injury" and concluded that he had failed to establish
"any real or immediate threat that [he] would be wronged again."46
Alluding to Lyons' damage claim, the Court added that the injury
that Lyons allegedly suffered would not go uncompensated. Finally,
the Court emphasized, "recognition of the need for a proper balance
between state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state officers.., in the absence of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate."4 7
B.

Applying the FinalProduct:Lyons in the Lower Courts

Since Lyons, the Supreme Court has handed down a number of
decisions discussing a plaintiffs standing to pursue injunctive relief
in federal court.4 8 Although early decisions suggested that the Court
40. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 118 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 105.
43. Id. at 105-06.
44. Id. at 106.
45. Kenneth M. Casebeer, Toward a CriticalJurisprudence-AFirstStep by Way of
the Public-PrivateDistinctionin ConstitutionalLaw, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.379, 411 (1983)
(arguing that under the Lyons Court's analysis, "the justiciability standard becomes conceptually interchangeable with the prerequisite for equitable relief").
46. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.

47. Id. at 112.
48. See, e.g., Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement
of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2298, 2306 (1991) (finding standing to seek injunctive
relief where plaintiffs alleged "personal injury" that was "fairly traceable" to defendant's
conduct); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1667 (1991) (finding
standing in class action where injury to plaintiff was likely to be "fairly traceable to de-
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may have planned to abate the severity of Lyons, 9 the Court recently issued a resounding reaffirmation of Lyons, eliminating any
doubt that the decision retains its original harshness 0 At present,
Lyons unquestionably provides the yardstick for lower federal courts
confronting injunction requests. In addition, lower courts appear
unanimous in concluding that Lyons' analysis of standing to seek
injunctive relief governs requests for declaratory judgments.5 1
fendant's. . - conduct and redressed through injunctive relief at the time complaint was
filed"); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 322 (1988) (finding standing where Court found that,
absent injunction, plaintiff "would be faced with a real and substantial threat" of injury);
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 476 (1987) (finding standing where enforcement of statute
posed "risk of injury to appellee's reputation [fairly traceable] to defendant's conduct");
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 n.3 (1983) (finding standing where plaintiff sought
to enjoin enforcement of statute and demonstrated a sufficiently "credible threat" of being
detained pursuant to such statute); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 156-61
(1990) (finding that third party seeking to appeal prisoner's death penalty sentence
lacked standing because threat of injury was too speculative).
49. Honig, 484 U.S. at 320-21 (demonstrating a willingness to find threat of injury,
even though noting unique circumstances of the case); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 355 n.3
(using "credible threat" standard rather than "real and substantial threat" test of Lyons);
see Fisher, supra note 18, at 1102 (suggesting that the "credible threat of recurrence"
formulation of Lawson is less strict in that it "is closer to a reasonable likelihood than a
virtual certainty" as required under Lyons); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 n.4
(1984) (holding that standing to seek injunction existed where right to injunctive relief
was premised upon actual encounter with INS agents pursuant to an ongoing
administrative policy, although future application of such policy to plaintiffs was arguably
uncertain).
In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), a major post-Lyons standing decision concerning a request for injunctive relief, the Court's disposition turned on the definition of a
judicially cognizable injury and the tracing requirement of standing doctrine. While relevant, these components of standing doctrine are not central to this Article.
50. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992), the Court found that the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate injury sufficiently imminent to establish standing. The
Court further observed that where, as in Lyons, "a plaintiff alleges only an injury at some
indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury happen are at least
partly within the plaintiff's control.., we have insisted that the injury proceed with a
high degree of immediacy." Id. at 2139 n.2; see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 'Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 226 (1992)
(asserting that Lujan placed "renewed emphasis on the notion that the harm must be
imminent and nonspeculative").
51. See, e.g., Foster v. Center Township of LaPorte County, 798 F.2d 237, 244 (7th
Cir. 1986) (dismissing claim for declaratory relief for failure to demonstrate Lyons
standing requirement of immediate danger of injury); Haislah v. Walton, 748 F.2d 359,
360-61 (6th Cir. 1984) (denying availability of declaratory relief where lawfulness of defendant's actions had been determined leaving no existing dispute for adjudication);
Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1446-47 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff lacked
standing to seek either injunctive or declaratory relief under Lyons because of his failure
to establish any real and immediate threat of injury); Buie v. Jones, 717 F.2d 925, 927-29
(4th Cir. 1983) (holding that prisoner serving life sentence lacked standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief related to pretrial detainment under Lyons because he was
unlikely to be detained in same facility again); Hudson City News Co. v. Metro Assocs.,
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Lower courts draw from Lyons in analyzing a variety of issues,52 and on several of these issues the courts are not in accord.5"
One particularly difficult issue dividing the lower courts is relevant
here: whether a plaintiff can establish standing to seek an injunction simply by relying on an existing damages claim. 4
141 F.R.D. 386, 390 (D. Mass. 1992) (citing Lyons); Staver v. Meese, 625 F. Supp. 1414,
1417-18 (S.D. W. Va. 1986) (finding that claim for declaratory judgment by plaintiff who
had not yet received a presidential pardon was too speculative and therefore failed to
satisfy the actual controversy requirement); Doe v. McFaul, 599 F. Supp. 1421, 1434 (E.D.
Ohio 1984) (observing that standing rules articulated in Lyons "govern all forms of
equitable relief, both declaratory and injunctive").
52. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Kroger Co., 778 F.2d
1171, 1174-76 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing the mootness discussion in Lyons and holding that,
unlike Lyons, the Union's claim for injunction pending litigation may evade review), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 815 (1986); Nicacio v. INS, 768 F.2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that members of Hispanic class had standing because, unlike Lyons, several class members had experienced repeated incidents and possibility of recurrence was not speculative); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983) (observing that Lyons dictates court restraint in issuing relief that affects enforcement of the criminal laws); Lewis
v. Tully, 99 F.R.D. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (distinguishing Lyons as not involving class action).
53. In addition to the split among circuit courts, discussed infra notes 60-61, the
lower courts have taken contrasting approaches to the question whether plaintiffs in class
action suits have standing to seek prospective relief. Compare Nicacio, 768 F.2d at 113637 and Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 669 n.24 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (finding plaintiffs
in class action to have standing) with Howard v. City of Greenwood, 783 F.2d 1311, 1313
n.2 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that standing is prerequisite for injunctive relief in class
action) and John Does 1-100 v. Boyd, 613 F. Supp. 1514, 1528-29 (D. Minn. 1985)
(denying plaintiffs' motion for class action certification where plaintiffs lacked standing to
pursue injunctive relief). Because the standing determination in each of these cases is so
fact-specific, it is difficult to assess whether these cases represent a lasting "split in the
circuits." See Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 681 ("Lower federal courts are divided as to
whether class action suits are an exception to the Lyons doctrine.").
The lower courts have also undertaken markedly different approaches to analyzing
whether the threat of injury to a plaintiff is sufficiently real and immediate to justify
standing to seek injunctive relief. Compare Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hosp. Dist.,
741 F. Supp. 1269, 1280-81 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (finding that a real threat of future injury to
formerly pregnant plaintiff existed where hospital had long-standing pattern of patient
dumping); Birl v. Wallis, 619 F. Supp. 481, 488 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (holding that state mental institution's trial visiting policy posed real and immediate threat of injury to former
patient where there was likelihood that patient would be recommitted in the future) and
Lake v. Speziale, 580 F. Supp. 1318, 1327 (D. Conn. 1984) (finding that indigent plaintiff
had standing to seek injunction requiring judges to appoint counsel to indigent individuals in civil contempt proceedings because plaintiff faced real threat of being charged with
civil contempt in the future) with Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 649 F. Supp. 43, 45 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (holding that hearing-impaired plaintiffs who were beaten, falsely arrested, and
imprisoned by police officers lacked standing to seek injunction because claim is speculative, and threat of future injury is not sufficiently real and immediate) and Smith v.
Montgomery County, 573 F. Supp 604, 608 (D. Md. 1983) (finding that plaintiff lacked
standing to challenge detention center's strip search policy because he failed to allege
credible threat of future injury from the policy).
54. See infra notes 60-61 for a discussion of cases on both sides of the issue.
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This issue implicates plaintiffs like Sarah Mills, who have a
palpable injury based on a past wrong (the death of her child) and
who also seek injunctive relief against future harm (similar treatment by the hospital staff). In Lyons, the plaintiffs damages claim
was severed from his injunction claim, and, as a result, the Court
decided only whether the plaintiff had standing to pursue his injunction request alone.5 The Court did not explicitly consider
whether a plaintiff simultaneously pursuing damages and injunction claims must make a separate showing that standing exists for
each type of relief.
The most plausible reading of Lyons suggests that a plaintiff
must, in fact, demonstrate standing for each type of relief soughteven where the plaintiff pursues several types of relief 66 Although
Lyons' damages and injunction claims were procedurally separated,
the existence of his damages claim and the injury underlying that
claim arguably could provide the "personal stake" and the "concrete
adverseness" necessary to confer standing to prosecute the injunction request.5 Lyons' injury transported his injunction claim from
the realm of fiction by providing real facts and real injury to give
substance and energy to the litigation. The Court decided, however,
that Lyons lacked the necessary standing to pursue the injunction
even though he had-in the Court's words--"a live controversy"5 8
with the City of Los Angeles through his damages claim.
The Court's analysis of the injunction request indicates that it
was not the separation of the injunction claim from the damages
claim that undermined Lyons' standing to seek the injunction.
Rather, the Court suggested, it was Lyons' failure to make the independent showing necessary to establish "an actual controversy" over
5 9 Such an independent showing would
the injunction request itself.
presumably be required even if the damages claim remained joined
with the injunction request.
In confronting this issue, most federal courts have agreed with
this reading of Lyons. The consensus among these courts is that,
under Lyons, a plaintiff must establish standing separately for each
type of relief requested." The Ninth Circuit, however, has reached a
55. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 98-100 (1983).

56. "Equitable relief no longer serves as alternative relief. It must be pled as its own
cause of action." Casebeer, supra note 45, at 410.
57. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 201 (1962)).
58. Id at 109.
59. Id. at 105-06.
60. Doucette v. Ives, 947 F.2d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 1991) (recognizing that standing to

seek damages for past deprivations does not establish standing to seek injunctive relief);
Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that a plaintiff who has been
injured can bring an action to recover damages, but that same plaintiff cannot maintain a
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markedly different conclusion. According to the Ninth Circuit, once
a plaintiff's standing to seek damages is established, a court need
not undertake a separate standing inquiry for equitable relief so
long as the damages and equitable claims are predicated on "the
same operative facts and legal theory."6 '
Although not the most plausible reading of Lyons, the Ninth
Circuit's position is nevertheless entirely consistent with the components of standing doctrine applied in Lyons. Lyons focused on the
"concrete adverseness" and "personal stake" requirements of standing law.6 2 As explained in detail below, not only is the Ninth Cirdeclaratory or injunctive action without demonstrating "a good chance of being likewise
injured in the future"); Robinson v. City of Chicago, 868 F.2d 959, 967 (7th Cir. 1989)
(finding Lyons to require separate showing of standing for each type of relief requested),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1035 (1990); National Maritime Union of America v. Commander,
Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 1228, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (interpreting Lyons to establish that damages standing may be available while injunctive standing is not); Tucker
v. Phyfer, 819 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th Cir. 1987) ("Lyons stands for the proposition that a
plaintiff who has standing to bring a damages claim does not automatically have standing
to litigate a claim for injunctive relief arising out of the same set of operative facts.");
O'Donnell Construction Co. v. District of Columbia, 762 F. Supp. 354, 361 (D.D.C. 1991)
(holding that plaintiff may possess standing as to damages but not as to injunctive relief
under Lyons), rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 420 (1992); see also Beattie v. United
States, 949 F.2d 1092, 1093 (10th Cir. 1991) (reading Lyons to provide that plaintiff with
standing for damages claim must still show a good chance of being injured in the future to
establish standing for injunction claim); Stewart v. County of Lubbock, 767 F.2d 153, 155
n.3 (5th Cir. 1985) (suggesting in dictum that standing to seek equitable relief should be
considered separately from standing to seek damages), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1066 (1986);
Olzinski v. Maciona, 714 F. Supp. 401, 411 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (reading Lyons to stand for
the proposition that past exposure to allegedly unconstitutional action provides standing
for damages but not for injunctive relief). But see Brower v. Village of Bolingbrook, 735 F.
Supp. 768, 772 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (suggesting that a plaintiff need not establish separate
standing for damages and injunction claims combined in same case, although decided after Seventh Circuit decision to the contrary).
61. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1423 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
935 (1987). Smith's requirement of overlap between the damages and injunction claim
modified the Ninth Circuit's earlier, less restrictive reading of Lyons in Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985). See Smith, 818
F.2d at 1423 ("Interpreting Giles in light of Lyons, we believe that we must
limit ... Giles .... ."); see also Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee, 849
F.2d 1176, 1179-80 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988) (following Giles as restricted by Smith); Blair v.
Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (determining that the case falls
"within the Giles exception... as... limited by Smith").
Although the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had previously interpreted
Lyons differently, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently rendered a decision in accord with the Ninth Circuit view. See Brower v. Village of
Bolingbrook, 735 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ill. 1990). The Brower court stated that Lyons does
not "apply to a suit seeking both damages and an injunction." Id. at 772. The district
court opined that Lyons "appeared to concede that Article I would be satisfied if the bid
for an injunction were combined with a suit for damages." Id.
62. One common formulation of standing doctrine provides for three minimum
requirements: (1) the party invoking the federal court's power "personally has suffered
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cuit's position consistent with these standard measures, but it is
also normatively more appealing than the approach taken by other
courts of appeals.

II. UNRAVELLING REMEDIAL QUESTIONS FROM STANDING
Proposals for reform of standing doctrine are plentiful. 3 Among
the proposals are persuasive entreaties to eliminate or substantially
modify the requirement-so troublesome to plaintiffs such as Sarah
Mills-that the plaintiff demonstrate an actual or threatened injury
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.6 In Part III below, I
too argue that this "redress requirement" is unnecessary and unsuitable in Lyons-type cases. Clearing the way for this argument,
this Part reviews the reasons for extricating the standing inquiry
from the decision whether a particular remedy will be appropriate in
a given case.
Of all the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of Lyons, one
point is clear: the Court endorsed a standing analysis that makes no
clear distinction between threshold questions about a federal court's
constitutional power to entertain a lawsuit and the decision whether
to award a particular remedy. 65 Specifically, the Lyons Court included in its standing formula an analysis of whether the injunction

some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," (2) the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action," and (3) the injury "is
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 478 (1982) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The focus of the Lyons problem in injunction
cases is the first requirement, concerning the plaintiffs "threatened injury." Factors such
as a plaintiff's "personal stake" in the controversy and "concrete adverseness" serve as
aids in assessing whether the threatened injury is sufficiently "real and immediate."
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02.
63. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structureof Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988);
Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials:
Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L, REV. 247 (1988);
Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and the When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363 (1973); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegrationof Article III, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 1915 (1986); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing:A Plea for Abandonment,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977). Fletcher, supra, at 221 n.4, contains an extensive list of
articles critical of standing doctrine.
64. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 63, at 229-34 (arguing for elimination of injury in
fact requirement); Nichol, supra note 63, at 1939-50 (proposing the reformulation of the
injury requirement); Nichol, supra note 18, at 70 (arguing that the Supreme Court should
reconsider "particularized injury standard"); Tushnet, supra note 63, at 700 (proposing
that courts reduce standing inquiry to a "candid assessment of the plaintiff's ability to
present the case adequately and a pragmatic evaluation of the factual concreteness"
(citation omitted)).
65. Fallon, supranote 18, at 7.
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Lyons sought would eliminate the threat of a particular injury." In
this standing analysis, the Court emphasized what I refer to
throughout this Article as "remedial efficacy": the effectiveness and
appropriateness of the remedy a plaintiff seeks. For injunctive relief,
a plaintiff must demonstrate a threat of injury that an injunction
could properly eliminate. Otherwise, Lyons prevents the plaintiff
from even trying to convince the court that its power to issue prospective relief is needed.
In essence, the Lyons Court collapsed analysis of jurisdictional
and remedial concerns into a single threshold enterprise. Not only is
this approach unnecessarily severe, but it also unwisely obscures
the concerns at the heart of the decision whether to issue an injunction. Moreover, neither the values traditionally associated with justiciability doctrines nor federalism considerations demand the approach espoused in Lyons.
Analysis of the Lyons problem differs significantly depending
on whether the plaintiff seeking injunctive relief has already received injury. Indeed, as explored in Part III, a plaintiff with a potential damages claim is far better situated to overcome the Article
III and prudential hurdles composing standing doctrine than one
with no such claim. For all plaintiffs, however, forceful arguments
counsel against Lyons' remedial efficacy approach. These arguments
are canvassed immediately below.
A.

Remedial Concerns

1. Equitable Principles.In his Lyons dissent, Justice Marshall
identified a number of severe consequences of the majority's approach to the case. His arguments were later expanded by commentators." In particular, Justice Marshall cited the broad discretion a
federal court normally enjoys in deciding whether to grant equitable
relief to protect a party injured by unlawful conduct.68 With full development of the facts motivating a dispute, a federal court may
readily grant relief that the court was actually inclined to deny at
the inception of the suit. Yet under the Lyons formulation, the court
must make the crucial remedial decision at the threshold of litigation-without the benefit of discovery or a full-scale hearing on the
merits of the plaintiffs allegations. 9 At this early stage, the court
66. Id.
67. Professor Richard Fallon's article on Lyons presents a particularly helpful examination of the practical consequences of the decision. Fallon, supra note 18; see also
TRIBE, supra note 18, at 114-20; Gerwatowski, supranote 18, at 794-802.
68. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 131 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (asserting that "it will rarely be easy to decide with any certainty at the outset of a lawsuit that no equitable relief would be appropriate under any conceivable set of
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study would have uncovmay well dismiss a case for which further
70
ered a sound basis for injunctive relief.
The distinctive potential of injunctions is their ability to anticipate and prevent threatened injury before harm (or at least further
harm) actually happens.7 ' Injunctions not only prevent suffering,
but also avoid the difficult task of reconstructing with money damages the position the plaintiff would have been in but for the defendant's wrongful conduct. 72 Injunctions usually enable courts to avoid
vexing questions, such as valuation, avoidable consequences, and
proximate cause. 73 The Lyons formula, however, blunts this potenfacts").
70. Cf Shanks v. City of Dallas, 752 F.2d 1092, 1095-96 (5th Cir. 1985) (deciding that

district court order based on lack of standing had effect of improperly denying injunction
on the merits).
The Supreme Court has noted that, in making rulings on standing at the pleading
stage, "general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may
suffice" because the Court will -'presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific
facts that are necessary to support the claim .... '" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.
Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992) (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 889
(1990)). Nevertheless, Lyons and the many decisions applying it in the context of a motion
to dismiss raise substantial doubt about the willingness of federal courts to adhere faithfully and literally to this language. See, e.g., Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 856-57 (7th Cir.
1989) (dismissing employee's suit against former employer because the termination of
employment destroyed plaintiff's standing); Hamill v. Wright, 870 F.2d 1032, 1035-36
(5th Cir. 1989) (dismissing civil rights claim seeking injunction against future contempt
proceedings because it was improbable that future contempt proceedings would also be
unlawful); Graham v. Jones, 709 F. Supp. 969, 974 (D. Or. 1989) (dismissing civil rights
claim for failure to show that police activities threatened immediate and irreparable injury); Runkle v. Cohen, 666 F. Supp. 700, 702 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (dismissing taxpayer's
complaint because changes in tax refund intercept program made assertions of future in1986)
jury purely speculative); Alvarez v. City of Chicago, 649 F. Supp. 43, 45-46 (N.D. Ill.
(dismissing complaint of hearing-impaired plaintiffs who were beaten and falsely imprisoned on two occasions because plaintiffs failed to prove that they would be beaten in the
future); Minne v. Indiana, 627 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (dismissing civil
rights claim by characterizing plaintiff's claim of future injury as conjectural, remote, and
speculative); see also Jones v. Bowman, 664 F. Supp. 433, 433-34 (N.D. Ind. 1987)
(denying motion to enjoin police from strip searching arrestees because plaintiff could not
show significant likelihood that she would be strip searched in the future).
71. See, e.g., Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65, 82 (1902) (holding
that "one of the most valuable features of equity jurisdiction [is] to anticipate and prevent
a threatened injury, where the damages would be insufficient or irreparable"); 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COAZMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 862 (13th ed. 1886) (indicating that
injunctions primarily serve the unique role of preventing and protecting). But see OWEN
K. Fiss, THE CrvL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 8 (1978) (characterizing an injunction as a special
"instrument designed to prevent a wrong from occurring in the future" is flawed in two
respects: "it overstates the claim of uniqueness and takes insufficient account of reparative and structural injunctions").
72. OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 58 (2d ed. 1984) (citing John
Leubsdorf, Remedies for Uncertainty,61 B.U. L. REV. 132, 134 (1981)).
73. Id. at 59; see also Doug Rendleman, The InadequateRemedy at Law Prerequisite
for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 351-52 (1981) (arguing that in addition to
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tial by severely limiting the availability of injunctive relief.
The rule of Lyons also makes cautious reflection on the propriety of prospective relief impossible. Yet, the inquiry whether to
grant an injunctive remedy needs to be rich in its consideration of
the specific facts and circumstances of a particular case. Indeed, the
hallmark of equity jurisdiction is the power of the chancellor to mold
each decree to the necessities of the case before the court. 74
To require an up-front decision on whether a plaintiff may seek
a prospective remedy robs the court and the parties of the opportunity to explore the possible ramifications of the requested injunction and to tailor an appropriate decree."5 In fact, the Lyons approach ignores the various factors that courts traditionally weigh in
evaluating whether to issue an injunction.
Under equitable doctrine, a court deciding whether to issue an
injunction should carefully weigh a number of factors, such as the
magnitude of the threatened harm, the probability and proximity of

avoiding imprecise measurement, injunctions serve the economic policy of actually forcing
parties to bargain privately).
74. See FISS, supra note 71, at 12 (arguing that injunctions can be "individuated" by
addressing a clearly identified individual, describing acts prohibited with specificity, and
delineating particular beneficiaries); Fallon, supra note 18, at 46 (indicating that
"[s]tandards of remedial propriety probably never should be cast as determinate rules;
trial court discretion seems unavoidable within the law of remedies"); Kent Roach, The
Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in ConstitutionalRemedies, 33
ARIZ. L. REV. 859, 862 (1991) (asserting that the central elements of equity are breadth
and flexibility of equitable remedial powers); Gene R. Shreve, PragmatismWithout Politics-A Half Measure of Authority for JurisdictionalCommon Law, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
767, 803 (1991) (noting that "[eiquity evolved to a large extent as a natural law reaction
against legal formalism").
75. See Fallon, supra note 18, at 73-74 (suggesting that Lyons' approach does not respect the aspiration of equity jurisprudence "to achieve a particularized balancing of interests that would be affected by granting or denying a particular remedy"); Pierce, supra
note 22, at 1273 ("How could the [Lyons] Court conclude that injunctive relief of some
type was an inappropriate way of limiting the [police department's] policy choices with respect to chokeholds [when the Court did not even know] what the [department's] policy
was?" (citation omitted)); cf Meltzer, supra note 63, at 318 (noting that discovery and
proof help uncover instances where there is a pattern of conduct to justify offensive deterrent remedies).
Casebeer, supra note 45, at 410-11, argues that the Lyons Court's collapse of the
standing and remedial inquiries into one threshold undertaking is a return to "code
pleading," long rejected by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Lyons Court
did not permit actual proof at trial to determine the nature of the remedy allowed, Casebeer argues that the Court treated the pleading stage of the litigation as a screen for remedial options and thereby rejected the notice pleading approach of the Federal Rules. Id.
at 411; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 121 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I am aware of no case decided since the abolition of the old common-law forms
of action.., that in any way supports [the Coures] crabbed construction of [Lyons'] complaint.").

950

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

its occurrence, and the difficulty of supervising the remedy.76 Especially for disputes such as Lyons' and Mills'--where the impact of
the requested injunction on the defendant can be significant-the
court also must carefully heed the hardship on the defendant imposed by the requested relief. In many cases, these factors-along
with the concern that jury trials are generally not available in
equitable proceedings 7 7-- can stand as important obstacles to injunctive relief.
Doctrine restricting. injunctions derives from the unique considerations implicated by prospective relief-for example, the tendency of injunction actions to drain court resources. Injunctions can
consume significant court time and money throughout the process of
formulation, implementation, administration, and enforcement.7 8
Restrictions may also reflect court concern that, because injunctions
are personal commands of the court, they require the court to risk
its power, prestige, and credibility more than other remedies. This
concern is exacerbated where the requested injunction may be impractical to implement, burdensome to supervise,7 9 or-in a case
such as Lyons' and Mills'--where the injunction potentially interferes with institutional management or the authority of another
governmental entity.co
Injunctions also operate as direct governmental restraints on
conduct. Therefore, a court may hesitate to issue an injunction if
there is any chance that it may ultimately prove unnecessary. Under
such circumstances, the injunctive decree would needlessly restrain
the -defendant and potentially taint her reputation.8 1 Moreover,
76. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 5

(1991) (undue hardship on defendant, supervision of relief, and other factors); Rendleman,
supra note 73, at 354 (difficulty in formulation, administration, and enforcement); Gene
R. Shreve, FederalInjunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 382, 389
(1983) (burden on court and defendant); Charles L. Hellerich, Note, Imminent Irreparable
Injury: A Need for Reform, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1044 (1972) (magnitude of harm and
probability of occurrence).
77. See, e.g., Rendleman, supranote 73, at 354 (noting that judges rather than juries
decide factual issues in equitable proceedings and arguing that the contemporary policy
favoring jury trials can persuade courts to prefer damages to injunctions).
78.Id.
79. LAYCOCK, supra note 76, at 269 (stating that courts should deny permanent relief
if impracticality problems outweigh disadvantage to plaintiff of receiving damages or
other "substitutionary" relief).
80. For review of concerns regarding the use of injunctions in institutional reform
litigation, see, for example, William A. Fletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution: Institutional Remedies and JudicialInterference,91 YALE L.J. 635, 635-49 (1982); Meltzer, supra
note 63, at 320-21; Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO.
L.J. 1355, 1378-1409 (1991).
81. See, e.g., SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(noting that "issuance of an injunction can sometimes have a harmful impact on the per-
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either as a result of overbreadth or unintended consequences, the
injunction may also prohibit or discourage perfectly lawful, socially
useful activity of the defendant or innocent third-parties. 2

Established principles of equity thus support the Lyons Court's
trepidation about granting injunctive relief. Lyons' "remedial
standing"8 analysis, however, is not the proper technique for handling the Court's concern. In fact, the analysis submerges timetested equitable doctrine, which stands ready to accommodate possible doubts about the propriety of injunctions in specific cases. 4 As
sonal reputation and legitimate business activities of the defendants" (citing SEC v.
Broadwell Securities, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965))).
82. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERNAMERICAN REMEDIES 223 (1985) (asking if key motivation behind restricting injunctive relief is concerned with prohibiting "socially useful
enterprises that might be run lawfully and harmlessly"). Injunctions can inappropriately
intimidate those entities to which they are directed as well as innocent third parties not
involved in the litigation. See LAYCOCK, supra note 76, at 160-64, 268-69. Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene, in describing the "most vulnerable charges against the injunction," note "that the injunction includes more than the lawless; that it leaves the
lawless undefined and thus terrorizes innocent conduct; that it employs the most powerful resources of the law on one side of a bitter social struggle." FELIx FRANKFURTER &
NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 81 (1930).

Commentators have suggested that legal rules properly restrict injunctions because
such rules pose a greater threat to economic efficiency than damages. See John Leubsdorf, Remedies for Uncertainty,61 B.U. L. REV. 132, 159 (1981); David S. Schoenbrod, The
Measure of an Injunction:A Principle to Replace Balancingthe Equities and Tailoring the
Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 655 & n.130 (1988) (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1115-24 (1972)); see also LAYCOCK, supra note 82, at 338-39
(outlining economic analysis of law's preference for damages over injunctions).
A related economic concern, less relevant to a Lyons-type case, focuses on the capacity of injunctions to impose on a defendant a greater financial obligation than a damages
judgment. Although an insolvent defendant may successfully evade paying a damages
judgment, injunctive orders can be much harder to avoid since they are backed by the
threat of contempt. The injunction may therefore force an insolvent defendant to perform
activities requiring expenditure of resources. Accordingly, courts in equity have expressed
concern that injunctions can undercut the law's concern with equality among creditors,
preferring the plaintiff over the defendant's other creditors who possess only an uncollectible damages judgment or no judgment at all. See LAYCOCK, supra note 76, at 271
(restating general rule that "[a] court should refuse specific relief if the relief would prefer
plaintiff over other creditors of an insolvent defendant").
83. Coined by Professor Fallon, the term "remedial standing" refers to the
"requirement that any requested remedy must be effective in redressing the injury on
which standing is predicated, or some other injury sufficient to support standing." See
Fallon, supra note 18, at 11.
84. For example, see Rendleman, supra note 73, for discussion of how modern courts
use the inadequate remedy at law requirement to evaluate economic, moral, and administrative factors bearing on the decision to grant an injunction.
I do not mean to suggest, of course, that there is no room for improving the traditional doctrine restricting injunctions. See generally LAYCOCK, supra note 76, and FISS,
supra note 71 (proposing reforms of equitable restrictions on injunctive relief). See also
infra notes 226-55 (discussing proposed changes to the doctrine of equitable ripeness).
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a threshold doctrine, the Lyons formula effectively renders useless
consideration of the equitable principles deliberately designed to use
facts developed in the course of litigation to restrict and customize
injunctive relief to specific cases."
2. Civil Rights Remedies. The effect of Lyons remedial standing
is pervasive, extending beyond the civil rights context in which it
was developed. Nevertheless, the decision's impact in civil rights
cases is particularly devastating.
For a number of reasons, injunctions have served as "the primary remedy in civil rights litigation."8 Injunctions are well suited
for accommodating the collective nature of many civil rights claims,
which often seek to change the status of an entire group. Professor
Fiss theorizes that civil rights litigants have increasingly used injunctions because they allocate power to the "citizen-grievant (the
power of initiation) and to the judiciary (the power of decision)."8 8
This allocation of power, Professor Fiss posits, is crucial to the litigant's attempt to overcome the tyranny of majoritarian forces. 89
Thus, Lyons significantly circumscribes a civil rights plaintiff's
ability to pursue an important, if not essential, tool for success.
Moreover, this effect of Lyons is not likely to be mitigated through
the class action mechanism. Indeed, for many types of civil rights
violations, it is impossible to identify a potential class because the
violations are short in duration and difficult to identify in advance."
In addition, the Supreme Court is likely to view a class of plaintiffs
as no more than a conglomerate of persons who each suffer from the
same infirmity as an individual plaintiff such as Adolph Lyons and
Sarah Mills: the inability to demonstrate a probable threat of repeated injury.9'
The fallout from Lyons is even more stark in the many civil
rights cases where damages are not even available. An array of obstacles-such as the Eleventh Amendment and absolute immunity
rules-prohibit money damages in suits challenging official miscon85. Cf Winter, supra note 18, at 1392 ("Standing obscures consideration and analysis
of the underlying questions of rights and remedies, of policies and values, by imposing a
single, unidimensional conceptual ordering of the process of adjudication.").
86. FISS, supra note 71, at 86.
87. Id. at 87; see Doug Rendleman, IrreparabilityIrreparablyDamaged, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1642, 1653 (1992) (reviewing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE
INJURY RULE (1991)) (suggesting that damages are not as effective as injunctions to accomplish change such as improved voting rights).
88. FISS, supranote 71, at 88.
89. See id. at 88-90.
90. Meltzer, supra note 63, at 309.
91. Id. at 309-10.
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duct, yet leave open the possibility of prospective relief.9 2 In such
cases, Lyons obliterates not only the most effective remedy, but the
sole remedy.
Another problem arises where government official conduct is
protected by qualified immunity. In qualified immunity cases, case
law allows for liability only where the conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."9 3 Where the law does not clearly prohibit
an official's activity, qualified immunity insulates the official from
individual liability for damages. Thus, the victim of the activity will
not receive damages if the law is unsettled. Moreover, if the victim
cannot meet the rigorous Lyons showing of threatened repeated injury, injunctive relief will also be unavailable. Because neither a
damages nor an injunction claim can proceed, the law may never become clearly settled, and the conduct can continue indefinitely despite the claims of many victims.94 The intersection of Lyons and
qualified immunity rules therefore creates an impasse not only for
many victims of official misconduct, but also for the development of
the law itself.
3. General Remedial Principles.Lyons also conflicts with broad
principles of federal court remedies jurisprudence. In fact, in a decision predating Lyons, the United States Supreme Court mapped out
an approach separating justiciability questions concerning the tim95
ing of a suit from questions about the propriety of injunctive relief.
Any doubt about the continuing vitality of this approach is belied by
the notion, repeatedly reflected in the cases, that courts9 6 enjoy wide
latitude to fashion remedies for violations of federal law.
The Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County
92. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (holding that judges enjoy absolute
immunity from suit for monetary damages, but not from prospective injunctive relief);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars
damages to compensate for past injury but not prospective relief).
93. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citations omitted).
94. This line of reasoning was suggested to me by Douglas Laycock. The argument
has greatest force if one interprets Lyons to govern requests for declaratory relief. See supra note 51 for a list of cases in which courts have applied Lyons in declaratory judgment
actions. See also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (equating declaratory and

injunctive relief).
95. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (asserting that "the
courts power to grant injunctive relief survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct"

(citations omitted)).
96. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("[Wlhere legal rights have been

invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." (citations omitted)).

954

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

Public Schools' strongly reaffirms "the traditional presumption"
that federal courts have at their disposal "all appropriate relief"
available to remedy transgressions of federal standards of conduct."
In other words, as long as a federal court has power to extend some
right of recovery, the court is vested with the authority to make that
right effective by using any of the procedures or remedies suitable
under the exigencies of a particular case. 9 Implicit in this formulation is the view that the threshold inquiry into whether a court
should take control of a particular dispute is wholly independent of
any decision about the appropriate remedial solution to the dispute.
The court's competence to award particular relief is presumed to be
within the court's expertise. 100
Finally, Lyons is in tension with the ethic of caution and patience permeating remedies law. Courts traditionally wait until after ruling on the merits of a case before allowing a remedial obstacle
to bar the specific relief requested. For example, in the context 1of
02
10 1
damages, a court will not use problems of mitigation, certainty,

97. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
98. Id. at 1034. Although not mentioned by the Court, the "tradition" from which this
principle springs may possibly trace its lineage to Marbury v. Madison wherein Chief
Justice Marshall bestowed on courts the power to provide a remedy when a right has
been violated:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.
One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection....
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
99. See Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1034 ("[IThe power to make the right of recovery effective implies the power to utilize any procedures or actions normally available to the
litigant according to the exigencies of the particular case." (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426,433-34 (1964))).
100. Id. at 1037 ("Unlike the finding of a cause of action, which authorizes a court to
hear a case or controversy, the discretion to award appropriate relief involves no such increase in judicial power.").
101. See, e.g., Boehm v. American Broadcasting, 929 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1991)
(inquiring whether employee mitigated damages only after establishing that employee
was wrongfully terminated); Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 778-79 (9th
Cir. 1990) (establishing liability of defendant in age discrimination case before addressing
whether employee mitigated damages); Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417,
1424, 1427-28 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding liability even though the employee failed to mitigate damages in employment discrimination case).
102. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 254-57 (1946)
(affirming liability ruling despite uncertainty of damages); Shannon v. Shaffer Oil & Ref.
Co., 51 F.2d 878, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1931) (discussing whether contract had been breached
even though damages were uncertain).
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or foreseeability05 to avoid adjudicating liability. Similarly, for injunctions, courts treat liability as a first step to be resolved before
weighing the propriety of permanent injunctive relief. 4 Courts generally reckon with restrictions on injunctive relief only after conclud05
ing that the plaintiff has succeeded on the merits of her claim.
B.

JusticiabilityValues

Lyons is also not mandated by the values traditionally associated with standing dogma.'06 These values, identified by courts and
103. See, e.g., Pinnacle Port Community Ass'n v. Orenstein, 952 F.2d 375, 379 (11th
Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's determination of damages as being unrelated to and
not arising naturally from the breach); Potti v. Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 938 F.2d
641, 649-50 (6th Cir. 1991) (remanding on the issue of damages to determine whether the
damages were within contemplation of the parties and whether the breach actually
caused the consequential damages); Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855
F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that once breach of contract is established, "a
plaintiff may receive consequential damages if the plaintiff proves with sufficient evidence that... [the breach] proximately caused the loss of identifiable professional opportunities"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043 (1989); National Controls v. National Semiconductor, 833- F.2d 491, 496-500 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that to sustain a damages award,
plaintiff must have provided sufficient evidence that the lost profits were proximately
caused by defendant's breach); Murphy v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir.
1985) (affirming award of attorney's fees as proper measure of damages arising naturally
from a breach of an insurer's implied contractual duty to act reasonably in refusing to pay
a claim).
104. See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Oriental Plaza, Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 915 (1st Cir. 1989)
(holding that for permanent injunctive relief, "the movant must show 'actual success' on
the merits of the claim, rather than the mere likelihood of such success" (citing Amoco
Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987))); Shanks v. City of
Dallas, 752 F.2d 1092, 1097 (5th Cir. 1985) ("A permanent injunction... is usually
granted only after a full trial on the merits of a particular suit."); CIBA-GEIGY Corp. v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 747 F.2d 844, 850 (3d Cir. 1984) ("In deciding whether a permanent injunction should be issued, the court must determine if the plaintiff has actually
succeeded on the merits .... If so, the court must then consider the appropriate remedy."
(citation omitted)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985); American Home Prods. Corp. v.
Barr Lab. Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1062 (D.N.J.) (holding that "[should plaintiff succeed
on the merits of at least one of its claims, the court may fashion an appropriate, permanent injunctive remedy so long as the balance of equities favors such a remedy"), affd on
othergrounds, 834 F.2d 368 (3rd Cir. 1987).
105. See, e.g., CIBA-GEIGY, 747 F.2d at 853 (addressing the proper scope of injunction after confirming that defendant violated the law); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007,
1012 (4th Cir. 1981) (summarizing how the district court, after conducting jury trial to
dispose of related claims, requested that parties present additional authority in connection with plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982); Winston
Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 141 (9th Cir. 1965)
(affirming trade secret liability before addressing challenge to length of permanent injunction); City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159 (1982) (holding that
actions of theatre constituted a public nuisance before questioning whether injunction
would be improper prior restraint on expressive conduct).
106. Cf LAYCOCI, supra note 82, at 223-25 (asserting that "constitutional and re-
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commentators as principles inspiring standing doctrine, include: (1)
ensuring that litigants are truly adverse; 1 7 (2) requiring that the
individuals in control of the litigation are directly concerned with its
outcome; 08 (3) guaranteeing that a concrete case illustrates the consequences of the court's decision;0 9 (4) preventing the federal judiciary from expropriating the prerogatives of the elected branches of
government; 110 and (5) shielding the federal judiciary from the distracting and weakening effect of a deluge of cases."' Upon close exmedial ripeness" serve "different primary purposes"). But see Shreve, supra note 76, at
401 (arguing that "[iut seems appropriate to draw a parallel between the imminence requirement of equitable jurisdiction and the 'case and controversy' requirement of Article
II" because the doctrines serve similar goals).
107. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (holding that standing requirements ensure that "issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that
the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor"); Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at
697 (arguing that several justiciability requirements seek to ensure that "the federal
court decision is likely to have an effect" on the parties); Fletcher, supra note 63, at 222
(asserting that standing seeks to ensure that "litigants are truly adverse").
108. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 24, at 306-11 (arguing that personal stake requirement serves values of representation and self-determination); Fletcher, supra note
63, at 222 (recognizing that standing "ensur[es] that the people most directly concerned
are able to litigate the questions at issue"); Evan Tsen Lee, DeconstitutionalizingJusti.
ciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 605, 651-52 (1992) (arguing that
standing requires the plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome in order to protect
"the interests of nonlitigants who will be bound by the stare decisis effect of the judgment").
109. See, e.g., Cohen, 392 U.S. at 106 (holding that standing requirements ensure
that "questions will be framed with the necessary specificity"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962) (asserting that a concrete context "sharpens the presentation of issues
[needed] for illumination of difficult Constitutional questions"); Fallon, supra note 18, at
13 (holding that "one set of concerns" animating standing doctrine "involves the functional requisites of informed adjudication"); Fletcher, supra note 63, at 222 (asserting that
standing seeks to ensure that a "case informs the court of the consequences of its decision").
110. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 2145 (1992)
(holding that standing doctrine ensures that federal courts are confined to their "separate
and distinct constitutional role" and is one of the essential elements identifying those
"Cases" and "Controversies" that are the business of courts rather than of the political
branches); Brilmayer, supra note 24, at 303 (noting that standing seeks to ensure that the
"countermajoritarian institution" of courts is held to a minimum "in a fundamentally
democratic society"); Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 697 (asserting that justiciability doctrines are concerned with whether judicial review should be refused in certain instances);
Monaghan, supra note 63, at 1376-77 (arguing that federal courts would violate separation of powers principles if they opened their doors to "ideological" plaintiffs without congressional authorization).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting that relaxation of standing requirements would divert limited resources and impair the effectiveness of federal courts); Fallon, supra note 18, at 15
(arguing that underlying standing doctrine is the notion that "scarce judicial resources
should not be diverted from their most important historical functions"); Meltzer, supra
note 63, at 308 (noting the contention that standing doctrine "guards against a vast and
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amination, the Lyons approach to standing is far broader than is
necessary to preserve these values.
1. True Adversity. According to standing jurisprudence, true
adversity between the parties is an important component of a litigant's standing to sue. A plaintiff whose interests are at odds with
the defendant's is required for the robust advocacy that assists
courts in making reliable decisions."' Courts can count on adverse
parties-the
argument goes-to sharpen the issues with vigorous
3
contest.1
Commentators have long attacked the logic of this reasoning."4
But one need not indict traditional standing principles to conclude
that Lyons' emphasis on remedial efficacy does not necessarily further the value of robust advocacy.
To be sure, evaluation of parties' adversity can rationally serve
as a surrogate for scrutiny of their ability to illuminate the issues
central to a dispute. But it is neither necessary nor logical to measure adversity through such an indirect means as remedial efficacy.
Remedial efficacy focuses on whether the plaintiff has asked for a
remedy that will eliminate real or threatened injury and is proper
under all of the circumstances of the case. This inquiry is far removed from the question whether the parties are at each other's
throats or-although amicable-nonetheless have truly conflicting
interests. Moreover, much more direct means of testing adversity
exist, such as studying whether the relationship between the parties
suggests collusion or investigating whether the 115
parties lack resources, ability, or inclination to litigate vigorously.
2. Personal Stake. Closely related to adversity is the standing
requirement that the plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome
of suit. The personal stake requirement guarantees that interested
parties are in control of litigation. Like the adversity standard, the
undesirable increase in litigation challenging government action"); Monaghan, supranote
63, at 1376 (recognizing that increasing the number of 'ideological' plaintiffs may
"critically impair the ability of a Supreme Court, already hard pressed, to give coherent
direction to our corpus of constitutional law"); cf Nichol, supra note 24, at 176 (arguing
that ripeness doctrine serves to ensure efficient allocation of governmental powers).
112. But see Meltzer, supra note 63, at 307 (arguing that this notion is "dubious in
general").
113. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 106.
114. For critical examples of this reasoning, see Louis L. Jaffee, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non.Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
1033, 1037-38 (1968) and Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional
Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 674 (1973).
115. Tushnet, supra note 63, at 679, 700 (asserting that collusion and lack of diligence are relevant to issue of adverseness).-
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personal stake requirement is designed to promote vigorous advocacy.
But "personal stake" focuses on another matter as well: adequate representation of nonlitigants whose interests are implicated
by the litigation. Because the precedential impact of a case can
touch nonlitigants' interests directly, notions of fairness suggest that
nonlitigants are entitled to some assurance of adequate representation in litigation.1 ' According to this reasoning, problems with adequate representation may arise because a plaintiff without a personal stake may not forcefully and vividly demonstrate the full scope
of a legal claim and may be less likely to anticipate the practical and
tactical consequences of various litigation strategies." 7
Supplementing the literature on representation, one scholar
has proffered yet another value animating the personal stake requirement-self-determination."I According to this view, requiring
the plaintiff to have a personal stake in the suit implements our legal system's preference for allowing individuals to make their own
decisions about asserting their legal rights." 9 The value of self-determination emphasizes individual personal choice and suggests
that "persons should not be able to assert the rights of others even
assuming they are good representatives." 120 Intimately tied to the
self-determination value are notions such as preference for individualism, distaste for governmental paternalism, and tolerance for
the choices of others.'2
116. Brilmayer, supranote 24, at 306-10; Lee, supranote 108, at 651-52.
117. Brilmayer, supranote 24, at 306-10; Meltzer, supra note 63, at 307.
118. Brilmayer, supranote 24, at 310-11.
119. Id. at 310-15. For a critique of this view, see Mark V. Tushnet, Comment, The
Sociology of Article Iii: A Response to ProfessorBrilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 172325 (1980). He argues that "no good reason exists to accept [the] assumption that the ideology of contemporary law is consistent only with self-determination, and inconsistent
with the altruism of the public interest litigant." Id. at 1724.
120. Brilmayer, supranote 24, at 310.
121. Id. at 310-11. Professor Brilmayer's self-determination theory has some caselaw support. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992), the Court
explained that where a plaintiff asserts the rights of third-party nonlitigants, a rigorous
standard is applied. In such a circumstance, the Court held:
The existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing depends on
the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and
whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume
either to control or to predict... and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to
adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.... Thus, when
the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he
challenges, standing is not precluded, it is ordinarily substantially more difficult
to establish.
Id. at 2137 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

19931

STANDING AND EQUITABLE RIPENESS

959

As with the adversity requirement, commentators have advanced persuasive arguments that the personal stake rule is inadequately tailored to satisfy its stated purposes. In particular, several
scholars question whether plaintiffs motivated by idealism alone are
presumptively any less able or motivated than plaintiffs with a more
"personal" or economic interest in the outcome of litigation. 1 2 Moreover, questions about whether a remedy is appropriate and effective
in a particular case are tangential to the issues of representation
and advocacy.
Yet the pertinence of the personal stake rule to a case such as
Lyons' or Mills' is not so easily dismissed. The concerns underlying
the rule are relevant not only to purely ideological plaintiffs, but
also plaintiffs like Adolph Lyons and Sarah Mills who seek injunctive relief that extends beyond their own personal protection. To the
extent that Lyons and Mills ask for prospective relief shielding more
than themselves, they are acting in the interests of third parties.1 ,
The self-determination and representation values are therefore directly implicated.
For Lyons and Mills, the concern with adequate representation
should not be an obstacle. To begin with, they are similarly situated
to others who may be affected by the litigation. Thus, if one were to
accept the view that those litigating for personal and proprietary
reasons are the "best" representatives of individuals not involved in
the suit,124 Lyons and Mills would be expected to conduct the litigaconsistent with the interests of those they
tion in a " manner
arepresent. 125 For those who believe that plaintiffs motivated by
122. See, e.g., Jaffee, supra note 114, at 1037 (arguing that there is "no predictable
difference" in litigation performance between a plaintiff with a purely ideological interest
and one with a more personal stake in the outcome of litigation); Lee, supra note 108, at
652 (arguing that the "supposition that ideological plaintiffs will provide less adequate
representation [than plaintiffs with a personal stake in the outcome is] overstated at best
and irrational at worst"); Meltzer, supra note 63, at 307 n.345 (arguing that "lilt is not
self-evident that traditional plaintiffs are wiser or more energetic than nontraditional ones").
123. Professor Tushnet argues that this phenomenon is typical of public interest litigation. Even a so-called "Hohfeldian" plaintiff, acting with the "personal and proprietary
interests of the traditional plaintiff," is not motivated by such interests alone and must
also be inspired by ideology in order to pursue litigation successfully. Tushnet, supra note
119, at 1708-12.
124. See Brilmayer, supra note 24, at 309. Professor Brilmayer posits the following
rhetorical questions: "Isn't a traditional plaintiff better able vividly to illustrate the adverse effects of the complained-of activity? Isn't there a danger that by seeking to change
the law too rapidly an ideological plaintiff will take greater risks by framing the issues in
a broader, more controversial, manner?" Id.
125. From the point of view of settlement negotiations, however, Lyons and Mills
may not necessarily act as the best representatives. Because they are potentially entitled
to damages, Lyons and Mills may have a personal incentive to drop their pursuit of prospective relief in exchange for a favorable monetary settlement. This incentive is not
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idealism make good representatives, Lyons and Mills should also
have no standing problem because they are clearly working in the
public interest for rewards to be shared by others not entangled in
the lawsuit.2 A court with doubts about such a plaintiff's representational capacity can inquire into the plaintiff's abilities, resources,
and dedication to the suit.2
As reflected in the typicality requirement for class actions, a
court can properly dispose of concerns with the adequacy of representation without raising the problem to the level of subject matter
jurisdiction.' There may be instances in which a court is particularly concerned with the plaintiff's capacity to "represent" those who
stand to benefit from the relief, but are not before the court. The
court can dispose of those concerns by informally inquiring into the
plaintiff's representational abilities or by requiring class certification before issuing broad-based relief.29
The value of self-determination is, however, more problematic
because the injunctions sought by Lyons and Mills are far broader
than necessary to protect only themselves. Nevertheless, this observation should not preclude them from seeking such relief. In fact,
Mills and Lyons are not acting solely as intermeddlers, but instead,
stand to benefit from part of the relief they seek.
Fundamentally, it is unclear how much weight the value of selfshared by those who stand to benefit from the prospective relief, but have no claim to a
potential damage award. Thus, such individuals could be harmed by Lyons' and Mills'
"representation."
This line of reasoning leads to the ironic suggestion that those who have been personally injured by challenged conduct may not be the best representatives. Before disqualifying Lyons and Mills on this basis, however, one must carefully consider how their
personal experiences actually improve their representational qualities and help ensure
that other justiciability values are satisfied.
126. See Tushnet, supra note 119, at 1711-12 (arguing that ideological or "non-Hohfeldian" plaintiffi are actually better representatives than plaintiffs motivated by personal or propriety reasons).
127. Cf id. at 1706 (asserting that a basic approach to standing asks, inter alia,
whether the "plaintiff [is] capable of generating a reasonably good, 'concrete' record for
decision"). Tushnet further argues that a court concerned with the representative abilities
of a plaintiff can use "auxiliary devices," such as guardians ad litem, experts, and amici,
to supplement the representative role of the plaintiff. Id. at 1716 (quoting Abram Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1311-12 (1976)).
128. For a class to proceed, a court must determine that the "claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class." FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(a)(3)
129. Under current case law, it is not settled whether a plaintiff proceeding without
benefit of class action certification can obtain an injunction protecting individuals beyond
the plaintiff herself. Compare Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973) (not requiring class certification) with Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring class
certification) and Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978) (requiring class certification).
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determination should bear in making decisions on standing. Compare, on one hand, a plaintiff who pursues relief only affecting others with, on the other hand, a plaintiff who asks for relief that affects herself and inadvertently also remedies the problems of others.
Under the premise that our society values the right of an individual
to make her own life decisions, standing doctrine is presumably
more disapproving of the first plaintiff than the second. Yet both
plaintiffs are equally at odds with the value of self-determination.
Indeed, the degree to which a third-party nonlitigant's life is invaded is not at all related to the degree to which the plaintiff's own
life is affected by the relief sought.3 0 The rules of standing, however,
fail to incorporate this important subtlety. Consequently, the role of
self-determination in resolving specific standing problems should
arguably be minimized.
One can also argue that, in certain circumstances, the law
should simply refuse to incorporate the value of self-determination.'13 Even assuming that Lyons' standing doctrine adequately
serves the value of self-determination, a court may conclude that the
value should not control where plaintiffs such as Lyons and Mills
perform the invaluable service of litigating important issues that
otherwise would not have come to the courts.3 2
For financial, logistical, or other reasons, the government may
have no avenue available for enforcing legal standards and litigating
significant issues. If private individuals whose lives are touched by
the issues are unable to bring suit, valuable suits may well never be
brought. Moreover, under some circumstances, flexible standing
rules may be needed because individuals directly affected by objectionable conduct find it logistically impossible to bring suit. 13 A
court should investigate these possibilities and weigh the impor130. Two additional points undercut the role of self-determination in standing
analysis. First, it is not entirely clear why a plaintiff motivated by the desire to use her
time and money to correct social wrong is any less deserving of the protection of legal doctrine than a plaintiff who uses her time and money to correct injustice to herself. Second,
on account of the doctrine stare decisis, it is rare that a plaintiff's lawsuit will affect only
herself. Perhaps, in accepting the phenomena that a lawsuit will almost always infringe
upon the rights and privileges of others, we must concentrate on ensuring that the plaintiff provides adequate representation.
131. Professor Tushnet suggests that it is unwise to place controlling weight on the
value of self-determination. He argues that no good reason supports the "assumption that
the ideology of contemporary law is consistent only with self-determination, and inconsistent with the altruism of the public interest litigant." Tushnet, supranote 119, at 1724.
132. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-18 (1976) (noting that physicians
can assert rights of patients because of their relationship to patients and patients' inability to assert their own rights).
133. See, e.g., id. at 117-18 (finding that patients who were denied Medicaid benefits
for abortions were not able to assert their own rights).
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tance of defining and enforcing legal standards before blindly
deny134
ing standing on the basis of the value of self-determination.
3. Concrete Context. Also underlying standing doctrine is the
related notion that a concrete case should apprise the court of the
consequences of its decision. Hypothetical situations are thought inadequate to clarify the true-life ramifications of a court decision and
therefore cannot assist the court in exploring the appropriate scope
and terms of its adjudication." 5 Proper decisionmaking demands
specific facts to illuminate the import of a ruling.
Lyons posited that, where threatened harm was not imminent,
a case does not present the requisite concreteness.3 In reaching this
conclusion, the Lyons majority seemed to assume that, where harm
is not knocking at the door, a court will never have a sufficient factual backdrop for making an informed decision. Although perhaps
useful, this assumption is too expansive and does not accurately
separate hypothetical disputes from real controversies with a definite context. In many cases, injury may be remote but, should it actually occur, a court can predict with confidence the specific, tangible details surrounding the injury. 3 '
The value of concreteness is best served when the court expressly and unequivocally evaluates whether the case presents facts
illustrating challenged conduct. To undertake this evaluation, a
court need not distract itself with inquiries into whether injury is
imminent or whether a particular remedy can eliminate or mitigate
the effects of challenged conduct.
4. JudicialRestraint.An often cited policy of standing doctrine
is to prevent judicial interference with the prerogatives of other
134. Professor Brilmayer would ease standing requirements where it appears that a
plaintiff is pressing an issue that would not otherwise be litigated, Brilmayer, supra note
24, at 315. Her reasoning, however, is apparently unrelated to the concern that, without
such an exception to rigid standing requirements, important issues would never be litigated. Id. Nevertheless, she maintains that an exception should be available where the
individuals possessing a right simply cannot assert it themselves-for example, when an
individual suffers because of a law that restrains another individual, such as a doctor,
from dispensing birth control. See id. at 317. Under these circumstances, Professor Brilmayer appears to be concerned that an avenue should be available for litigation of important issues. See id.
135. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,472 (1982) (noting that standing doctrine assures that legal
questions are not resolved in "rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual
context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences ofjudicial action").
136. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983).
137. Particularly in cases of widespread illegality, a plaintiff may be unable to show
impending harm, but may be able to point to numerous instances of past specific conduct
that can predict how future conduct will unfold. Meltzer, supra note 63, at 306.
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branches of government. 138 In particular, standing seeks to prevent
the "anti-majoritarian federal judiciary from usurping the policymaking functions of the elected branches." 13 9
Federal courts have traditionally been cast in the role of protecting the rights of individuals and minorities.' 40 By requiring a
plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury or threat of injury
that sets her "apart from the citizenry at large,"' standing attempts
to confine federal courts to their traditional role. More generalized
grievances shared by the collective population are_ presumed grievances of the majority, which are best redressed in executive, administrative, or legislative forums. 42 Focusing a court's attention only
on a plaintiff's individual injuries, standing doctrine thus excludes
courts "from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the
other branches would function in order to serve the interest of the
majority itself."'
138. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (noting that the standing requirement
confines federal courts to "a role consistent with a system of separated powers," giving
power over those disputes "traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the
judicial process"); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (noting that rules of standing
serve to limit the role of courts in resolving public disputes); Fallon, supra note 18, at 14
(noting that where plaintiffs assert generalized grievances about government, Court has
fashioned judicial doctrines to limit role for courts in "democratic society" (citations omitted)); see also sources cited supra in notes 50, 110. See generally Marla E. Mansfield,
Standing and Ripeness Revisited: The Supreme Court's 'Hypothetical' Barriers, 68 N.D.
L. REV. 1, 37-46 (1992) (discussing the doctrinal roots of separation of powers as a important component of the standing decision's "philosophical pedigree"); David A. Logan,
Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 37
(discussing
the interrelationship between standing and separation of powers).
139. Fletcher,
supra note 63, at 222 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Allen v. Wright,
468
U.S. 737, 760 (1984) (permitting the use of standing to bring generalized challenge that
government is not acting in accord with the law "would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action" (quoting Laird
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972))); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 133 (3d ed. 1988) (noting that Allen v.
Wright is "distinctive in suggesting... that the application of standing doctrine in a particular case should be guided by separation of powers concerns").
In contrast to most recent justices, Chief Justice Warren doubted whether standing
implicates separation of powers concerns in the same way as other justiciability doctrines:
[Separation of powers] problems arise, if at all, only from the substantive issues
the individual seeks to have adjudicated. Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to
whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable ofjudicial resolution.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968).
140. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 23, at 16-23; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881,
894(1983).
141. Scalia, supra note 140, at 881.
142. Mansfield, supranote 138, at 43.
143. Scalia, supra note 140, at 894.
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Regardless of the merits of this argument,' it does not support
an approach to justiciability that resolves remedial issues at the onset of litigation. To begin with, remedial issues have little relevance
to the central concern fueling the separation of powers component of
justiciability doctrines-to avoid enmeshing the judiciary in145 substantive issues of liability with significant "political" elements.
Moreover, although the ultimate choice of remedy may implicate separation of powers principles, 46 the institutional prerogative
of a court to make remedial choices is insulated from separation of
powers attack. As previously mentioned, a conservative majority of
the United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the historical role of federal courts to select the relief appropriate for particular cases. 147 Not only did the Court emphasize the broad latitude
of courts in this area, it also suggested that federal judicial authority
to select among remedies is actually essential to the Constitution's
separation of powers: "It is well to recall that [judicial authority to
award appropriate relief] historically has been thought necessary to
provide an important safeguard against abuses of legislative and executive powers... as well as to insure an independent judiciary."'
144. Professor Brilmayer casts doubt on the role of separation of powers analysis as
an underpinning of justiciability doctrines. Professor Brilmayer's critique focuses on the
argument that courts must be restricted because they are countermajoritarian bodies in
fundamentally democratic societies. According to Professor Brilmayer, this emphasis ignores the observation that even legislatures themselves "risk behaving in a countermajoritarian fashion," if they are fulfilling "their responsibilities to consider whether their
activities are constitutional." Brilmayer, supranote 24, at 304.
Professor Brilmayer's reasoning appears confined to a critique of the role of justiciability doctrines where a court is deciding constitutional questions, such as reviewing
agency or legislative action for compliance with the constitution. See id.
145. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 227 (1962) (holding that an issue may be
considered nonjusticiable if it involves elements of political questions); Paul Hubschman
Aloe, Note on PresidentialForeignPolicy Power (PartI): Justiciabilityand the Limits of
PresidentialPolicyPower, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 517, 538 (1982) (arguing that standing and
ripeness requirements help courts avoid becoming enmeshed in political disputes where
they do not belong); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v.
Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 648 (1985) (noting that federal constitutional cases do not
in most instances raise separation of powers concerns because they "cannot in good faith
be deemed political"); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968) (finding that
separation of powers problems arise from the substantive issues the individual seeks to
have adjudicated).
146. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Separationof Powers and the Scope of FederalEquitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664 (1978) (arguing that separation of powers
should restrain federal judiciary's exercise of equitable powers against state governments).
147. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1034 (1992). For further discussion ofFranklin,see supranotes 97-100 and accompanying text.
148. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1037 (citing Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838)).
Several commentators have articulated another separation of powers argument un-
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5. Increased Caseload. Docket control, the final value supporting standing doctrine, provides no more help to Lyons than the other
principles. The role of standing in restricting federal court litigation
is simple: standing doctrine is a significant barrier to federal court
access because the doctrine protects federal courts from a burgeoning docket. 4 9 Loss of efficiency and prestige are thereby avoided, and
federal courts may effectively decide and administer those cases that
do come to judgment.
This argument is flawed in at least two respects. On a general
level, docket control alone is rarely a reasoned basis for segregating
the plaintiffs allowed access to federal court from those who are excluded. 150 The rationale ignores the possibility that, for policy reasons, a particular plaintiff should be allowed to bring her case in
federal court.'5 ' Moreover, in the specific context of injunction suits,
Lyons' rigid standing rules may not be necessary to control federal
dockets. The remedial obstacles to injunctive relief may be so rigorous that plaintiffs will hesitate before commencing such actionsthereby limiting the federal court caseload through self restraint.'52

dercutting Lyons. These commentators suggest that the Court's approach to justiciability
in Lyons has improperly circumscribed Congress' ability to handle remedial issues. They
reason that, by analyzing remedial questions under the rubric of Article III, the Lyons
Court effectively insulated the questions from congressional control. See BATOR ET AL.,
supra note 139, at 268 ("Has the Court's insistence on examining [remedial standing] issues in Article III terms unduly restricted the power of Congress to deal with remedial
questions in public law litigation?"); FALLON, supra note 18, at 48-59 (suggesting.that
Lyons should not have premised its ruling on the Constitution, thereby restricting Congress' power over standing issues).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
150. Cf Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just OurPolicy: Why the
Well-Pleaded ComplaintRule Sabotages the PurposesofFederal Question Jurisdiction,38
HASTINGS L.J. 597, 653-54 (1987) (addressing docket control justification for well-pleaded
complaint rule).
151. See id. at 654 ("[1It is unthinkable that [a] sovereignty should [fall to provide a
tribunal] because of a comparatively insignificant matter of expense. Congestion should
be relieved, if this is necessary, by creating additional courts. ... " (quoting John J.
Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A. J. 433, 438
(1932))). See generally Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, ConstitutionalConstraint
and the ManipulationofJurisdiction,64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 321 (1989) (discussing
the improper use of jurisdictional barriers such as standing "to shunt certain classes of
litigants away from federal courts").
152. Cf.Meltzer, supra note 63, at 308 (arguing that concern with opening floodgates
of federal litigation "is particularly doubtful as applied to suits seeking deterrent remedies, since the elements of the claim for relief.., are likely to be sufficiently difficult to
establish that plaintiffs will not lightly commence such actions"). See supra notes 78-85,
infra notes 199-210, 214-18 and accompanying text for discussion of the traditional obstacles to injunctive relief.
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C.

FederalismRestraints
It is no secret that the Supreme Court uses justiciability doctrines to restrain federal court intervention into state and local affairs.' 5 ' In fact, in Lyons itself, the Supreme Court used federalism
restraints as an explicit basis for declining to find jurisdiction in the
case.' 4 Thus, although the traditional rationales underlying justiciability doctrines do not adequately justify Lyons, support for the
decision's approach to standing may lie in the sensitive area of state
and federal relations. Upon further scrutiny, however, federalism
fails as a justification for Lyons' remedial standing test. 55
First, federalism is either irrelevant or peripheral to several
classes of cases in which courts have held Lyons to govern. Courts
have adhered to Lyons in suits challenging the actions of federal officials' 56 as well as disputes between private parties. 5 '
153. Cf Tushnet, supra note 63, at 663-64 (noting that "standing has ... become a
surrogate for decisions on the merits, providing an especially useful approach for the
Court when a decision on the merits might overturn settled precedent").
154. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983). See supra note 47 and accompanying text for discussion of the federalism foundation of Lyons.
155. See Nichol, supra note 63, at 1948 (arguing that the Lyons Court speaks extensively of "federalism sensitivity," but "fails to explain. . . why the dangers posed by an
injunction limiting police use of deadly force are more debilitating than a bevy of other
acceptable federal restraints"); see also Meltzer, supra note 63, at 320 (finding no difference in terms of federalism concerns between interference endorsed in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), and interference rejected in Lyons; rather the difference in cases is nature of the remedy sought).
156. See, e.g., Bryant v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 525, 528-29 (4th Cir. 1991) (federal civilian
employee seeking to enjoin retaliatory job performance appraisals by armed services personnel); Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 557-59 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Salvadoran nationals seeking to enjoin United States immigration officials from interfering with right to seek political asylum); Hernandez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230, 233-35 (5th
Cir. 1990) (American of Puerto Rican descent seeking to enjoin immigration officials from
applying discriminatory policies at border checkpoints); Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 85658 (7th Cir. 1989) (former Forest Service employee seeking to enjoin United States Department of Agriculture from discharging employees for exercising their constitutional
free speech rights); Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (freelance
journalist seeking equitable relief against a policy of illegal FBI searches); LaDuke v.
Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1326 (9th Cir. 1985) (residents of migrant farm dwellings challenging INS policy of conducting searches without a warrant or probable cause).
Separation of powers issues are certainly implicated in federal officer cases. Nevertheless, as explained supra in the text accompanying notes 138-48, separation of powers
is not an adequate justification for the rigors of Lyons standing requirements.
157. See, e.g., Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 864 (3d Cir. 1990) (abortion
clinics seeking permanent injunction against future harassment by anti-abortion protesters); New York State Natl Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1347-49 (2d Cir.
1989) (abortion clinics seeking to enjoin anti-abortion activists from blocking access to
abortion facilities), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Weiss v. Eastern College Athletic
Conference, 563 F. Supp. 192, 195 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (collegiate athlete seeking
injunction allowing him to play varsity tennis).
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Even in those cases where federalism is directly implicated,
numerous devices unrelated to justiciability are available to protect
the prerogatives of state and local governments. Because injunctions
are distinct and specific commands, they can be particularly intrusive into the affairs of state and local officials. One may argue,
therefore, that damage actions more appropriately vindicate federal
rights while preserving the autonomy of state and local governments.
Yet specific tools-such as the Anti-Injunction Act 58 and
Younger abstention 5 9-- are designed to handle unique problems of
injunctive relief.' In addition, more general innovations, such as
the "custom or policy" requirement for actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, are significant limitations on federal court power over state
and local governmental action.' 6 ' If the myriad controls developed
for injunctions or for § 1983 actions are unavailable, a court is free
to follow the course outlined in Lyons:6 2to conclude that generic concerns of comity require denying relief.1
A court's decision to recognize standing is not necessarily a direct affront to state prerogatives. Generally, the most significant
irritant to federal/state relations is not a federal court's decision to
adjudicate a challenge to state action, but rather the court's final
158. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988). See, e.g., Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623,
630 (1977) (noting that the Anti-Injunction Act is designed to prevent conflict between
federal and state courts (citing Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309
U.S. 4, 9 (1940))).
The Anti-Injunction Act provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
159. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court fashioned an abstention doctrine preventing federal courts from interfering with pending state criminal prosecutions.
Since Younger, the Supreme Court has extended the doctrine to prevent federal courts
from disrupting state civil and administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (civil proceeding between private parties); Ohio Civil Rights
Cornm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (administrative proceeding).
160. See generally New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S.
350, 359 (1989) (recognizing that "there are [a few narrowly defined] classes of cases in
which the withholding of authorized equitable relief because of undue interference with
state proceedings is the normal thing to do" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
161. Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), established that municipal governments may be sued under § 1983 only for injury resulting from official custom
or policy. Id. at 690-91. Similarly, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 543 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), established that-for
all defendants under § 1983-a plaintiff cannot premise a procedural due process claim on
the basis of random and unauthorized acts of officials. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 14,
at 377-437, for a general survey of restrictions on § 1983 liability.
162. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983); see Roach, supra note 74,
at 859 (noting that equity "grants a court discretion not to award intrusive remedies").
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decision to condemn and nullify the state action. 163
The Younger doctrine, of course, recognizes that where certain
state proceedings are pending, a court's decision to entertain an injunction action can disrupt the state proceedings so significantly as
to call for federal court abstention. But Lyons and its antecedents do
not suggest a similar concern. Nothing in Lyons or related decisions
mandate that, where a federal district court confronts a request for
injunctive relief, federalism precludes the court from considering the
request past the initiation of suit.",
Moreover, the practicalities of litigation counsel delaying decision on federalism issues until later in the case. It is not until the
facts and theory of a dispute have developed that a court can best
appreciate the federalism implications of its ruling. 6 5 Accordingly, a
threshold doctrine like standing is neither needed nor appropriate to
police federal court forays into state and local domains. 6
III. WEAvING AN APPROPRIATE STANDING MODEL:
THE Two FACES OF LYONS
Compelling arguments suggest that the ultimate decision
whether to grant a particular remedy should be removed from

threshold investigation of whether a plaintiff has standing to bring
suit. The question still remains, however, whether analysis of remedial efficacy has any role in evaluating standing in an injunction
case. As it turns out, the answer is "no." Nonetheless, the process of
reaching this conclusion is complicated, requiring analysis of the two
general categories of injunction plaintiffs: those who have been in163. See REDISH, supra note 18, at 96 (arguing that violation of judicial restraint
principles comes, if anywhere, "in the ultimate judicial invalidation of... challenged governmental action, not in the mere fact of the court's willingness to adjudicate the constitutional challenge").
164. Official immunity doctrines present another instance where courts have concluded that the mere allowance of suit is a significant source of irritation. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (noting that, because official immunity includes "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability..., it is effectively
lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial"). Nevertheless, unlike instances
where immunity doctrines are relevant, the injunction suits governed by Lyons do not
necessarily implicate personal liability of government officials. Accordingly, the immunity
doctrines' special concern for protecting individuals from the burdens of litigation do not
govern with the same force in many Lyons-type lawsuits.
165. Cf Fallon, supra note 18, at 44 ("ITihe impulse to erect threshold barriers ignores the reality that not every lawsuit affecting a public institution stretches judicial
competence or intrudes too deeply into institutional management.").
166. Cf Shreve, supra note 76, at 419. Professor Shreve argues that the doctrine of
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), inappropriately requires a federal court to decline
jurisdiction in certain cases automatically. Professor Shreve advocates that instead courts
should undertake a fact-sensitive approach to equitable jurisdiction questions now governed by Younger.
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jured and fear future injury as well as those who have no past injury
but only fear of prospective harm.
A.

The Lyons Plaintiffwith a Damages Claim

Plaintiffs like Sarah Mills and Adolph Lyons have suffered past
injury and therefore come to court with a potential damage action as
well as a claim for prospective relief. Although the Lyons majority
suggests otherwise, these plaintiffs should encounter little difficulty
establishing standing. Generally, the potential for damage recovery
assures that each of the values underlying standing is adequately
served. An additional inquiry into the efficacy of the injunctive remedy thus performs no useful function in evaluating the plaintiff's
standing. Importantly, avoiding rigorous restraints on plaintiffs
seeking both damages and injunctive relief is also fully consistent
with standard jurisdictional principles governing federal courts.
1. JusticiabilityValues. As mentioned in Part I, the lower federal courts diverge over whether a plaintiff with a potential damage
claim need establish separate standing to seek injunctive relief.
Most courts agree that a plaintiff must establish standing separately for each type of relief requested; 67 courts within the Ninth
Circuit, however, hold that a plaintiff can establish standing to seek
injunctive relief simply by relying on an existing damages claim and
demonstrating that the damages and injunction claims derive from
"the same operative facts and legal theory. " 16a In most cases, the
Ninth Circuit's approach fully serves the values inspiring standing
and other justiciability doctrines.
Where a plaintiff has both damages and injunction claims, she
can readily meet justiciability's adversity, personal interest, and
concrete context components through her damages claim alone.
Since the plaintiff has suffered injury at the hands of the defendant,
she has a personal interest-adverse to the defendant-in litigating
a real set69of facts and ultimately collecting a judgment from the de1
fendant.
Separation of powers poses little difficulty under the Ninth Circuit view of Lyons. A plaintiff with a damages action asks the federal
court to act in its most traditional, least controversial capacity: to
167. See supra note 60 for examples of cases reflecting this view.

168. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1423 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 935 (1987). See supra note 61 and accompanying text for further discussion of case
law from the Ninth Circuit.
169. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 126 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(noting that Lyons' claim for damages ensured that he had a personal stake in the outcome of litigation).
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adjudicate a specific dispute between specific parties and to issue
relief directly related to the injury suffered. 170 Arguably, a court
granting broad-based injunctive relief treads more closely to the discretionary and policy-making functions of coordinate branches of the
government than a court ordering damages alone.17 1 Yet merely entertaining the possibility of injunctive relief does not jettison the
court into territory held by the other governmental branches. To the
extent that injunctions implicate separation of powers concerns,
those concerns can be examined toward the end of the litigation
when the court is considering whether and to what extent to issue
such relief.
The final justiciability value, docket control, also presents no
problem under the Ninth Circuit approach. Alowing a plaintiff to
pursue an injunction without a separate standing showing preserves
the efficiency of the system. In fact, federal court dockets should not
swell, since the plaintiff is already using court resources to litigate a
damages action. 172
Hence, the justiciability values are apparently satisfied by the
Ninth Circuit approach. To test this conclusion, consider the following change in the Sarah Mills story: assume that Mills, a plaintiff
with a significant damages action, became sterile as a result of the
birth of her child at home. Certainly, this increases her potential
170. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (noting that federal
courts are restricted to remedies that are narrowly tailored to the nature and extent of
constitutional violation); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83 (1976) (describing the traditional model of adjudication as
operating on the assumptions that litigation is bipolar, retrospective, self-contained,
party-initiated, party-controlled, and that right and remedy are interdependent); see also
Sturm, supra note 80, at 1360-65 (discussing the perspectives on remedies and traditional
forms of adjudication).
171. See Nagel, supra note 146, at 724 (arguing that separation of powers principles
should circumscribe and define judicial power to issue equitable remedies).
172. Even where the plaintiff does not actually litigate the damages claim together
with the injunction claim, the mere potential for a damages claim will in most instances
be sufficient to satisfy the justiciability values. The potential damage claim can inspire
the plaintiff to litigate vigorously and with personal animation. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at
126 n.18 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the severance of Lyons' damages and
injunction claims does not diminish his incentive to establish that defendants breached a
substantive standard of conduct).
Additionally, the bare existence of a potential damage claim indicates to the court
that the case arises from a specific factual setting that can inform the adjudication.
Docket control should not be a significant problem because a very limited class of plaintiffs are apt to pursue their injunction claim without the benefit of their damages claim.
Finally, while separation of powers may be a concern, the court is still only contemplating
injunctive relief and is not committed to issuing and implementing broad commands that
may intrude on the prerogatives of other branches. Cf. Redish, supra note 18, at 96
(asserting that judicial restraint principles are violated by judgment itself rather than act
of entertaining constitutional challenge).
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damage award. But her sterility renders her incapable of personally
benefitting from her requested injunction. Should she be able to seek
an injunction on behalf of others who may be subject to similar
wrongs in the future?
The answer-it seems-should be "yes." The case still has adversity, personal interest, and concrete context inspired by Mills'
damages claim. Representation may pose a slight problem, but Mills'
prior membership in the class of individuals directly affected by the
injunctive relief should assist her in effectively and intelligently
pursuing the injunction claim.1 73 Self-determination should not be
an obstacle because Mills still has a significant interest in the
case. 17 4 In addition, the impact on a court's docket is very small.
The next inquiry is whether Mills' injunction request is so intrusive from a separation of powers perspective that the court
should deny her the opportunity to litigate. On reflection, separation
of powers is also not an insurmountable obstacle. According to Supreme Court case law, standing serves separation of powers principles by preventing "suits challenging, not specifically identifiable
Government violations of law, but the particular programs agencies
established to carry out their legal obligations." 75 In order to fall
within this proscription, the challenged conduct must first be classified as "governmental." Assuming one could make such a characterization in Mills' case, her prior experience with the defendants (the
hospital and its employees) enable her to identify future specific
"violations of law" to remedy.
Enforcing separation of powers principles, the Supreme Court
also condemns plaintiffs with simply generalized grievances of broad
social application. 7 Mills, however, hardly has a mere abstract dispute with the hospital and its employees; she (as well as other
plaintiffs) can point to prior instances of improper conduct that animate and inform specific requests for forward-looking relief.

173. Cf., e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401 (1975) (holding that Article III is
satisfied even where class representatives' claim becomes moot after class certification);
see also Brilmayer, supra note 24, at 318 ([Rlepresentation arguments against allowing
ideological challenges apply less forcefully when the would-be plaintiff was once but is no
longer a class member." (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (1979))).
174. To the extent that self-determination is nevertheless implicated because Mills is
seeking relief that does not affect her at all, it should still not raise too much difficulty for
the reasons discussed in the text accompanying supranotes 130-34.
175. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 (1984).
176. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("[The Court has refrained from adjudicating
'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,'
pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches."
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975))).
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2. The Redress Requirement and Remedial Efficacy. One common formulation of standing doctrine provides that a plaintiff must
demonstrate an actual or threatened injury that "is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" in the litigation. 17 This "redress requirement" resembles Lyons' remedial efficacy standard, which-as
we know-operated to deprive Adolph Lyons of the right to seek injunctive relief even though his damages claim gave him a "live controversy"' with the City of Los Angeles. It is, therefore, a significant question whether the redress requirement serves an important,
meaningful role for cases in which a plaintiff seeks both damages
and injunctive relief.
The redress requirement is easily traced to several of the justiciability values: adversity, personal interest, and separation of powers. Where the requested remedy is likely to relieve the plaintiff's
injury or threatened injury, the court may assume that the plaintiff
will advocate vigorously and take a personal interest in the litigation. In addition, a close nexus between the court's decision and an
identifiable injury to the plaintiff will
assure that the court is acting
79
in a conventional judicial capacity.
Given the connection between the redress requirement and
justiciability values, one could argue that the requirement serves as
a useful shorthand to ensure that the values are satisfied. As with
any legal rule, however, the redress requirement is not always necessary or appropriate to serve the values it was designed to promote. 80 Indeed, in the context of a plaintiff with both damages and
injunction claims, a separate standing inquiry for each type of relief
sought is rarely necessary to effect the policies influencing standing
and other justiciability doctrines. Thus, it seems nonsensical to adhere to a categorical rule precluding such a plaintiff from seeking
injunctive relief on the basis of an uncritical application of the redress
requirement-or, its close cousin, Lyons' remedial efficacy standard.
177. Id. at 472 (quoting Simon v. East Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38
(1976)).
178. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983).
179. See sources cited supra note 170 for discussion of the conventional view of the
proper judicial role. But see Nichol, supra note 145, at 646-47 (arguing that the redressability requirement is unrelated to separation of powers concerns). Professor Nichol contends that "redressability' takes no account of the relative efficacy of possible action
taken by [another] branch of government. Redressability asks only whether the judiciary
can construct a useful remedy, not how favorably that remedy compares with hypothetical cures that could be fashioned by another branch." Id. at 647 n.63.
180. See Tushnet, supranote 119, at 1705 (stating that once the purposes of standing
are expressed in legal doctrine, "the rules become easily manipulable and may produce
unintended results"); cf Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation,and Stories, 42 DUKE L.
J. 630, 642-43 (1992) (asserting that language initially bearing plain meaning can take on
a life of its own, separated from meaning initially intended).
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3. JurisdictionalPrinciples. Established principles of federal
court jurisdiction strongly support the view that a plaintiff who has
established standing to seek damages can press a related injunction
claim without making a separate showing of standing. The United
States Constitution extends the federal judicial power only to
"Cases" or "Controversies,
and standing rules purport to implement this jurisdictional limitation. Case law interpreting the "case
or controversy" requirement suggests that-in disputes such as
Lyons' and Mills'--a plaintiff can aggregate injunction and damages
claims into one federal lawsuit without
showing an independent ju182
risdictional basis for each claim.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that two
claims can compose the same constitutional "case" whenever they
derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact."" In United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs,'84 the Court applied this concept, holding that a
federal court could exercise federal question jurisdiction over federal
and state law claims under certain circumstances. Under Gibbs, a
plaintiff may append her state law claim to her federal law claim if
she can demonstrate that the federal claim is sufficiently substantial to confer federal question jurisdiction on the district court and
the state law claim shares a common factual nucleus with the federal claim. In a recent statutory enactment,' Congress ratified and
incorporated this constitutional analysis, clarifying that federal
district courts shall exercise "supplemental jurisdiction" to the full
extent that the Constitution permits."6
Applying principles of supplemental jurisdiction to a case such
as Lyons' or Mills', suggests that the plaintiff should be relieved of
demonstrating separate standing for the injunction and damages
181. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.
182. This line of reasoning seems to have strong intuitive appeal. As a teacher of federal court jurisdiction and civil procedure, I encounter a student "discovering" the argument at least once a semester. In addition, the reasoning is outlined in Fallon, supra note
18, at 22 n.115. Professor Fallon points out that Lyons was not the first time the Court
"failed to accede to the logic of Gibbs in a case presenting nontraditional attributes of
public litigation." Id.
183. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
184. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
185. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988).
186. Karen Nelson Moore, The Supplemental JurisdictionStatute:An ImportantBut
ControversialSupplement to Federal Jurisdiction,41 EMORY L.J. 31, 39 (1992) (noting
that in enacting § 1367, Congress chose to define supplemental jurisdiction as broadly as
constitutionally permissible); John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of
Federal Jurisdictionand Venue: the Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 735, 764 (1991) (asserting that § 1367 "extends to the limits of Article
III, thus ratifying and incorporating the constitutional analysis of United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs").
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claims. Under Gibbs' analysis, once standing to seek damages is established or conceded, a court should conclude that both claims compose one case properly subject to federal court jurisdiction. 187 Lyons
and the cases construing it, however, do not recognize this synthesis.
Whether by design or accident, the Ninth Circuit's approach to
the Lyons problem roughly tracks the analysis in Gibbs and its
progeny. Under the Ninth Circuit approach, a plaintiff is relieved
from establishing separate standing for damages and injunction
claims only if the two claims involve "the same operative facts and
legal theory."""
Measured against principles of supplemental jurisdiction, the
Ninth Circuit test actually restricts more than is necessary: the notion of a constitutional "case" does not require identity of legal theory underlying two claims joined together. Nevertheless, the similarity between Gibbs and the Ninth Circuit formula lends credence
to the Ninth Circuit test and casts doubt on the jurisdictional underpinnings of the other Circuits' more niggardly approach to plaintiffs seeking distinct remedies in two related claims.
B.

The Lyons Plaintiffwithout a Damages Claim

Turning now to a new character: Sarah Mills' neighbor who is
presently pregnant, without health care coverage, and living in poverty. Mills' neighbor wishes to bring an action for injunctive relief,
asking the court to ensure that Mills' tragedy does not recur either
for the neighbor or others like her. From the perspective of standing,
this plaintiff is analytically more challenging than Mills.189 The
neighbor is not yet hurt and thus may run into difficulty with the
justiciability values.
To ensure that competent plaintiffs can overcome justiciability
hurdles and perform a vital enforcement function for issues of significant public import, many commentators have suggested that
courts allow citizen suits by plaintiffs motivated primarily by idealism.'9° For plaintiffs like Mills' neighbor, however, it is not necessary
187. Fallon, supra note 18, at 22 & n.115. Of course, Gibbs and the parallel statutory
provision, 28 U.S.C § 1367 (1988), contain a discretionary element, allowing the district
court to decline jurisdiction over a pendent claim under certain circumstances. Gibbs, 383
U.S. at 726; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) (1988). The existence of this discretion, however, does
not undercut the conclusion that both damages and injunction claims are within a federal
court's power to decide.
188. Smith v. Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1423 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935
(1987).
189. See supra note 125 for an outline of an argument to the contrary.
190. See, e.g., Jaffee, supra note 114, at 1043-47; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1738, 1744-47 (1975);
Tushnet, supra note 119, at 1706-09. To the extent justiciability concerns are jeopardized,
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to sweep so broadly. Nor is it necessary to reach so far in the other
direction as to impose on the neighbor an impossible showing such
as that required under Lyons. 9 ' The justiciability values can be satisfied by a more moderate standard.
1. Justiciability Values. Because the neighbor has no injury,
her only claim to judicial intervention derives from the possibility of
future injury. To the extent that her fear of future injury is unfounded, she experiences difficulty with standing's disdain for hypothetical disputes and abstract controversies. The neighbor's case
may therefore lack the requisite concreteness and may implicate the
separation of powers concern that generalized grievances are more
appropriately addressed to other branches of government. Moreover,
the neighbor is more apt to lack the requisite personal stake in the
suit than a plaintiff who has already been injured and has a potential damages claim to litigate.'9 2
Although not entirely clear, these concerns may have given rise
to the rigorous remedial efficacy standard in Lyons. I propose, however, that a more reasonable standard would insure that the justiciability values are satisfied in a case such as the neighbor's. Specifically, I would require that the neighbor make two showings: (1)
some reason exists for suspecting that the defendants may engage in
future illegal conduct and (2) the neighbor may be among those
some may conclude that public interest litigation requires such a sacrifice. See, e.g., Jaffee, supra note 114, at 1044-47.
191. As previously discussed, the Lyons decision held that, in order to establish an
actual controversy, Adolph Lyons would have to allege that he would have another'encounter with police and either all police officers in Los Angeles always choke citizens they
encounter or the City of Los Angeles actually authorized the officers to use deadly chokeholds on citizens they happen to encounter. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 106
(1983). Applied to Mills' neighbor, this standard would presumably require her to show
first that she would enter the hospital as a maternity patient. In addition, the Lyons formula would presumably force her to demonstrate that all maternity patients are always
treated in the same way as Sarah Mills or that the hospital actually orders or authorizes
its employees to act in such a manner.
192. Interestingly, an argument could be made that Mills' neighbor may actually
serve as a better plaintiff than Mills who has already suffered an injury. Indeed, Mills
may well have learned by experience and will take her own steps to ensure that the defendants' actions do not so dramatically touch her life again. Under this reasoning, Mills
has less of a personal stake in the outcome of the suit than one who does not have the
same life experiences to mold her actions and incentives.
This argument, of course, ignores the vigor and resolve that Mills' injury may bring
to her case. The argument also ignores the very real understanding that Mills can share
with the court concerning the defendants' actions and their effect on the lives of others.
Both this understanding and the motivating force of Mills' prior injury are characteristics
that-according to traditional standing doctrine-make Mills a better plaintiff than one
who has not already received injury.
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threatened by this conduct. 19 While making these showings, the
neighbor will illustrate for the court a specific factual context for the
suit-removing the case from the realm of the hypothetical. Separation of powers problems would be avoided because she will demonstrate that the court's decision will provide distinct, individual relief
based on an identifiable threat.
Since the plaintiff will demonstrate that she is within the class
of individuals at risk, she should also satisfy concerns of adequate
advocacy and representation of others affected by the suit. The value
of self-determination, however, may provide more of an obstacle. Indeed, like Adolph Lyons and Sarah Mills, the neighbor is seeking
relief beyond that necessary to remove the threat to herself. A partial response, of course, is that the neighbor is not merely intruding
into the lives of others because she too stands to benefit from the relief requested. The earlier discussion of Lyons and Mills provides
another response: it is not evident that the value of
self-determina194
tion should control decisions on standing questions.
Finally, docket control should not be a critical issue if plaintiffs
like Mills' neighbor are allowed standing to pursue injunctions. The
significant remedial obstacles to injunctions may cause such plaintiffs to hesitate before bringing actions. 19 This restraint on federal
court suits would be fortified by my proposed requirement that the
plaintiff demonstrate some reason to suspect the defendant of future
illegality and to believe that
the plaintiff may be among those
6
threatened by the illegality.
It should be noted, however, that the proposed requirement should
not be so strictly applied as to require plaintiffs to prove a significant
probability of injury. Such a rigorous showing is unnecessary since the
plaintiff is seeking only to convince the federal court to hear the case,
not to issue the actual relief requested. After discovery and the
development ofthe facts in the case, the plaintiff can then be required to
197
justify for the court the necessity for a prospective remedy.
193. Meltzer, supra note 63, at 296 (advocating similar requirements for challenges

to governmental illegality). Apparently, Professor Meltzer would also include in justiciability analysis a showing of "the appropriateness of the particular form of deterrent relief
sought, giving due concern to a broad range of remedial considerations." Id. For the reasons outlined earlier in this Article, I would defer consideration of such remedial matters until
after the threshold justiciability inquiry. See supranotes 67-105 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 130-34 and 174 for further discussion of the value of self-determination as it relates to Lyons and Mills.
195. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of this argument.
196. See Meltzer, supra note 63, at 308 (arguing that concern with opening floodgates of federal litigation "is particularly doubtful as applied to suits seeking deterrent
remedies, since the elements of the claim for relief... are likely to be sufficiently difficult
to establish that plaintiffs will not likely commence such actions").
197. There remains the question whether to allow standing for individuals who have
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2. The Redress Requirement and Remedial Efficacy. The twopart showing I advance need not be supplemented with notions of
remedial efficacy or with standing doctrine's redress requirement.
As for a plaintiff with both damages and injunction claims, a plaintiff like Mills' neighbor need not demonstrate that she is seeking a
remedy that is likely to redress the threatened injury. 19
Of course, it is not irrelevant to the justiciability values that
the injunctive relief the neighbor seeks is capable of protecting her
from the threat of the defendant's illegal conduct. Nevertheless, she
will have established the requisite personal stake in the suit by
demonstrating that she is within a sphere of danger created by the
defendant's threat. Any suggestion that the precise relief she requests is unjustified, unwise, or unnecessary can be addressed later
in the litigation.
IV. PATTERNING THE EQUITY INQUIRY:
THE ROLE OF EQUITABLE RIPENESS
For Sarah Mills and her neighbor, the foregoing has established their entitlement-under traditional justiciability values-to
have a federal court decide their injunction requests. I now turn to
the later stage of the litigation-when the court must decide
whether the facts of their cases actually support their requested in-

junctions.
As a matter of traditional equity theory, a major impediment to
injunctive relief is the irreparable injury rule, which requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that, absent an injunction, she will be irreparably injured and will have no adequate remedy at law.' 99 Beeven less of a personal connection with the claims litigated than Mills' neighbor. Indeed,
circumstances may arise where no person exists with an articulable basis for believing
they are personally threatened by illegality. This dilemma is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, for arguments supporting the view that standing requirements need

to be relaxed in such instances to allow litigation of important legal issues, see, for example, Jaffee, supra note 114, at 1044-47; Louis L. Jaffee, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1282-92 (1961); Meltzer, supranote 63, at

314-19 and Winter, supra note 18, at 1503-14.
198. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text for discussion of this issue in the

context of plaintiffs with both damages and injunction claims.
199. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.5, at 57 (1973) (indicating that the first
task of a plaintiff seeking equitable relief is to explain why equitable relief is better than

a legal remedy).
Professor Douglas Laycock explains that the irreparable injury rule and the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate no adequate remedy at law are different formulations of the same principle:
Today, the typical application of the irreparable injury is a comparison between
some equitable remedy that will prevent a threatened injury, and money damages that will compensate for the injury after it has occurred. If money damages
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cause the threatened "injury" Mills and her neighbor seek to avoid
includes death or serious bodily harm to a laboring woman or her
child, this rule should not pose a serious barrier for them."' Instead,
their more troublesome problem is the equitable requirement that
the threat of injury be "ripe."
Traditionally, courts have applied the equitable ripeness rule
quite strictly and, in fact, have tied the ripeness requirement intimately to the general presumption against injunctions enforced
through the irreparable injury rule. In this Part, I argue that this
union of ripeness and irreparable injury should be dissolved and
that courts should consider equitable ripeness together with other
concerns favoring and disfavoring injunctive relief. Finally, I identify substantial reasons in favor of courts relaxing their rigid enforcement of equitable ripeness. My aim is not to articulate a scientific formula for ripeness problems, but instead to expose some of the
difficulties with the current approach.20 1
A.

EquitableRipeness: Content of TraditionalFabric

In Lyons, the Court invoked the doctrine of equitable ripeness,
explaining that it could not authorize an injunction because Lyons
made no showing of any likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury."20 2 The Court further reasoned that "[tihe speculative nature of Lyons' claim of future injury requires a finding that
this prerequisite of equitable relief has not been fulfilled." 203
This ruling was, of course, dictum since the Court had already
held that Lyons lacked standing even to attempt to convince a fedwill be 'adequate,' then the injury is not irreparable and will not be prevented.
LAYCOcK, supra note 82, at 336. Some, however, have sought to distinguish the two formulations. See, e.g., Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 356 n.9
(D.C. Cir. 1972), reu'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 1 (1974); LAYCOCK, supra note 76, at 8
& n.10 (1991); Shreve, supranote 76, at 392-93.
200. See, e.g., Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1338 (2d Cir.
1992) (maintaining that where evidence demonstrated that plaintiffs may face torture
and death absent injunctive relief, district court did not err in finding irreparable harm
requirement satisfied); Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80, 81 (2d Cir. 1988) (maintaining that
inmate's death is sufficient to show possibility of irreparable harm to other inmates).
201. I do not go so far as to urge the revitalization of the common law remedy of quia
timet. Quia timet relief operated much like injunctive relief but included no requirement
that the defendant's alleged threat to the plaintiff's rights be either imminent or certain.
See, e.g., EDWARD R. RE AND STANTON D. KRAUSS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES
340-41 (3d ed. 1992). Quia timet relief is of little significance today. See ROBERT N.
LEAVELL ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITIMON, AND

DAMAGES 12 (4th ed. 1986).
202. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 102, 111 (1983) (quoting O'Shea v. iUttleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).

203. Id.
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eral court to issue his requested injunction. Nevertheless, the equitable formulation cited by the Court is common to many injunction
cases, including requests for both individual and class-based relief. Moreover, the formulation is not confined to cases in which the
plaintiff's standing is an issue.
The Lyons Court's rhetoric actually combined the irreparable
injury rule and equitable ripeness doctrine. Surely, however, the
Court did not mean to suggest that the nature of the injury Lyons
cited-being choked to death-was somehow not irreparable.
Rather, the Court was concentrating on Lyons' failure to provide
sufficient evidence that he would be choked again-a concern focusing on the prematurity or ripeness of his suit. 20 4 Perhaps the Court
was also reacting to Lyons' failure to support his request for broad
reaching relief with class certification or other formal showing that
he was qualified to represent those who stood to benefit from his requested injunction.0 5 Nonetheless, Lyons' blurring of the irreparable
injury rule and equitable ripeness doctrine is typical of the approach
followed by other courts.0 6
When courts do focus on equitable ripeness, they generally apply the doctrine strictly. In fact, courts often require that the threatened harm must be "practically certain" to occur.0 7 Even in decisions where a Lyons standing problem consumes much of the court's
attention, courts still apply equitable ripeness with a vengeance, requiring much more than prior instances of the challenged conduct. 0 8
204. See LAYCOCK, supra note 76, at 221 (asserting that despite the irreparable injury language, the Lyons Court actually was concerned with ripeness).
205. The case law is divided on whether a plaintiff proceeding without benefit of a
class action certification can obtain an injunction protecting individuals beyond the
plaintiff herself. Compare Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring class
certification) with Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978) (permitting injunctive relief without class certification) and Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973)
(allowing injunctive relief without class certification).
206. See LAYCOCK, supra note 76, at 220-21 (indicating that the most typical opinions
combine ripeness and irreparable injury).
207. See Hellerich, supra note 76, at 1031 n.22, 1032 n.25 (surveying a number of
cases and concluding that "as a general rule courts will require a 'practical certainty' that
the anticipated nuisance will result"); see also Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492,
537 (8th Cir. 1975) (modifying injunctive relief in an environmental case where "the risk
of harm to the public is [only] potential, not imminent or certain, and [defendant] says it
earnestly seeks a practical way to abate the pollution").
208. See, e.g., Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 67-69 (1st Cir. 1990) (asserting that
plaintiff not only failed to establish standing, but also failed to show threat of future unlawful conduct sufficient to justify injunctive relief); Committee of Central American
Refugees v. INS, 682 F. Supp. 1055, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (stating that to justify injunctive relief under Lyons, plaintiff must not only show a pattern of unlawful conduct but
also must show that the pattern is due to a policy of defendant and that immediate irreparable injury is likely); Grant v. Cohen, 630 F. Supp. 513, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding
that even if the plaintiff had standing to seek injunctive relief, she failed to demonstrate a
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The rigidness of the ripeness doctrine is also fortified by its
dual requirements: likelihood and immediacy of harm. Courts usually require that a plaintiff not only show that harm is nearly certain to occur, but also demonstrate that the harm will occur in the
immediate future.20 9 Thus, as applied, the doctrine has both timing
and probability elements.2 10
B.

Reweaving Portionsof TraditionalDoctrine

As it presently exists, the traditional doctrine of equitable ripeness has potentially useful features. One commentator, for example,
explains that the doctrine serves primarily to ensure that the plaintiff petitions the court between the time she can assure the court of
impending harm and the time at which the court can no longer actually avert the harm."' According to this view, the doctrine thereby
avoids needless injunctions-which are "wasteful, unfair, and potentially chaotic. "2" This reasoning is most appropriate in circumstances that, by design, require preliminary steps before the defendant can engage in harmful conduct. Under such circumstances, the
defendant effectively cues the plaintiff that it is time to invoke the
protection of equity.
Other cases, such as Lyons', concern wrongful conduct for
which the defendant provides little warning. In such cases, the
plaintiff cannot pinpoint when impending harm is relatively certain.
Strictly applied to these cases, the doctrine is potentially overbroad.
Applied with proper perspective, however, the doctrine may be
serviceable in identifying those disputes for which injunctive relief
should be considered. Under a light-handed approach, a court can
real and immediate threat of irreparable injury); see also Stefaniak v. Michigan, 564 F.
Supp. 1194 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (finding that the plaintiff failed to show sufficiently real
and immediate threat of injury to justify injunctive relief under Lyons).
209. Hellerich, supra note 76, at 1031-32. Occasionally, a court finds that the presence of one element alone is sufficient. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
419 U.S. 102, 142-43 (1974) (allowing suit to enjoin conveyance where conveyance was
quite certain, although it would take place at an unspecified future date).
210. The classic case of Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 Ch. D. 688 (1885), illustrates this observation. The plaintiff in Fletcher feared that the river water it used to produce paper
would become polluted by defendants negligence in maintaining a chemical waste dump
upstream. The court rejected plaintiff's injunctive request because it would be "some
years" before defendant's pollutants would injure plaintiff. Id. at 700. Unpersuaded that
there was a significant likelihood that these events would occur, the court also dismissed
plaintiff's suggestions that a landslide or collapsed wall would cause more precipitous
damage. See also Shreve, supra note 76, at 391-92 (arguing that Fletcher also illustrates
the integration of the imminence concept with a requirement that the threatened wrong
be substantial).
211. Shreve, supra note 76, at 391-92.
212. Id. at 401.
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determine if harm is sufficiently certain to ensure that the plaintiff's claims have some grounding in fact and in law. The doctrine
can thereby assist the court in analyzing whether the benefits of an
injunction outweigh its costs.
The dual character of equitable ripeness doctrine is especially
well-suited to ensure that injunctions are not needlessly issued. The
probability or likelihood component of the doctrine specifically focuses on the necessity for prospective judicial intervention. Similarly, the timing or imminence component of equitable ripeness limits the period in which defendants and affected third parties are
constrained by a decree, thereby minimizing government regulation
of potentially useful conduct.
The timing component also assists with the difficulty of predicting whether an injunction is actually necessary. Logic suggests that
the further in time one is from a harm-causing event, the more
likely that intervening, unanticipated factors will prevent that event
from happening. Not surprisingly, established forecasting theory
propounds the thesis that the more distant a forecast target date,
the less accurate the forecast will be.215
Because of these salutary characteristics of equitable ripeness
doctrine, the entire doctrine should not be abandoned in favor of new
material. Nevertheless, several innovations suggest themselves.
1. Loosening the Knot: Extricating Irreparable Injury from

Equitable Ripeness. Unlike the doctrine of equitable ripeness, the irreparable injury rule has recently received abundant scholarly attention. Much of the analysis has been negative, concluding that the
rule is a jurisdictional artifact that is either dead in practice or illadvised in theory214 For the purposes of this Article, one idea
213. See WILLIA ASCHER, FORECASTING 199 (1978).
214. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 71, at 38-85 (asserting that the irreparable injury rule
is unwise, unjustifiable, and not taken seriously by courts); LAYCOCK, supra note 76, at 5

(I conclude that the irreparable injury rule is dead. It does not describe what cases do,
and it cannot account for the results."); Rendleman, supra note 73, at 358 (commenting
that although irreparable injury rule can serve important purposes, it "masks the intellectual process of identifying and evaluating interests .... grants excessive discretion
and is too imprecise to ensure predictability"); Doug Rendleman, IrreparabilityIrreparably Damaged, 90 MCH. L. REV. 1642, 1649 (1992) (reviewing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE
DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991)) (arguing that "because of new principles, the rule no longer meant what its words conveyed; it survived nominally and with
reduced force"); see also Gene R. Shreve, The PrematureBurial of the IrreparableInjury
Rule, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1063, 1072 (1992) (reviewing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991)) (noting that "[plerhaps [Laycock] is right in suggesting
that some commentators have been too cordial to the rule"). But cf. Shreve, supra note 76,

at 392-95 (opining that the rule serves to assist in principled decisions to grant or deny
injunctions and accommodates many important public policy concerns).
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emerging from this scholarship is particularly important: whatever
the proper role (if any) for the irreparable injury rule, it should not
be confused with equitable ripeness.
Upon initial inquiry, courts' tendency to treat equitable ripeness and irreparable injury as one concept is understandable: both
help in measuring the degree to which the threatened injury should
be feared.2 15 Ripeness focuses on whether the injury is probable and
impending; the irreparable injury rule asks whether money damages are an adequate remedy if the injury actually occurs.
Despite this connection, the distinction between the two concepts can be quite significant. Once a court concludes that a threatened injury is not irreparable, the plaintiff's only choice is to seek
damages if the injury eventually occurs. On the other hand, a finding of lack of ripeness should only delay further injunction proceedings until the plaintiff can demonstrate that the threat has matured.
Thus, a court finding that a plaintiff has failed to show a ripe threat
of injury21is
not necessarily relegating the plaintiff only to a damages
6
remedy.
Confusion can be avoided by severing the two concepts. A court
dismissing a suit under the rubric of irreparable injury may effectively relegate the case to a damages action, even though the plaintiff need only make another request-later in time-for equity to
intervene. The analytical clarity resulting from isolating the two
doctrines may also allow courts to understand better their own decisions, fulfill their obligation to explain their decisions to litigants,
and provide unambiguous guidance to future courts struggling with
similar issues.1 7 Finally, segregating the doctrines also avoids interjecting into ripeness analysis the many serious, but largely irrelevant, issues from the debate over the continued validity of the irreparable injury rule. 1
215. Cf. LkYCOCK, supra note 76, at 220 (suggesting that although analytically distinct, two ideas "can be verbally combined into a single sentence: that there be a ripe
threat of irreparable injury").
216. This line of reasoning is derived from id. at 221. See also Rendleman, supra note
214, at 1656 (arguing that "[r]ipeness and mootness are not ways to choose between a
legal and an equitable remedy-they are reasons to decline all relief").
217. See, e.g., Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth Amendment, 64 TEIP. L. Q. 629, 657-58 (1991) (reviewing salutary effects of fully
developed, clear, and candid judicial opinions).
218. Cf. LAYCOCK, supra note 76, at 266-67, 272 (treating the irreparable injury rule
as dead, yet endorsing the equitable ripeness principle). But cf. FISS, supra note 71, at 8085 (suggesting that some may try to use difficulty in prophesying as justification for irreparable injury rule).
I do not mean to suggest that a court should divorce analysis of the extent of threatened harm from analysis of the likelihood and imminence of its occurrence. A court may
fruitfully undertake the two inquiries in tandem. Instead, I advocate separating consid-

1993]

STANDING AND EQUITABLE RIPENESS

983

2. Creating the Final Cloth: Integrating Equitable Ripeness
with Other Concerns. Courts evaluating equitable ripeness often
have articulated the ripeness issue only as a predictive problem,
severed from other factors bearing on whether to issue an injunction. 219 Equitable ripeness, however, is intimately tied to several interrelated considerations relevant to selecting an injunction as the
most appropriate and effective remedy in a case.
Indeed, cut loose from the process of weighing benefits and
costs of injunctive relief, equitable ripeness has no meaning other
than as an abstract measurement of threatened harm. Under such
circumstances, the doctrine serves as little more than an empty slogan invoked to deny or grant relief. The better approach, then, is to
use equitable ripeness to evaluate the factors pertinent to choice of
remedy. Earlier in this Article, I explained the standard reasons
courts are thought to hesitate before issuing injunctions: conserving
court resources and prestige, avoiding undue restrictions on defendants and innocent third-parties, protecting the civil jury trial right,
and avoiding inappropriate interference with institutional management and other governmental entities. 2 In each case, these costs of
injunctive relief must be weighed against the benefits of an injunction.2 1 Benefits to be analyzed include the advantages of preventing
actual harm to the plaintiff and avoiding cumbersome valuation
tasks and other difficulties of replicating with damages the position
222
the plaintiff would have been in but for the defendant's wrong.
The importance of these various costs and benefits differs, of
course, according to the facts of each particular case. In Sarah Mills'
suit-for example-a court need not tarry with such issues as preferring one creditor over another and imposing its power on another
governmental unit. Focusing on the specific facts of the case, howeration of the unique equitable requirement of irreparable injury-along with all of its
baggage-from consideration of equitable ripeness issues.
219. See, e.g., SEC v. Cenco Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 197-200 (N.D. M11.1977)
(analyzing whether past securities law violations establish sufficient likelihood of future
violations); Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-Way House, Inc., 218 A.2d 383, 386 (Conn.
1966) (denying injunctive relief because plaintiff failed to show foundation for fear of
harm from defendant's conduct); Fletcher v. Bealey, 28 Ch. D. 688, 698-704 (1885)
(analyzing whether pollution from plaintiff's manufacturing process is sufficiently imminent and substantial).
220. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text for further discussion of these
concerns.
221. See LAYCocK, supra note 76, at 268-72 (noting that, in practice, courts should
balance advantages of injunctive relief against concerns such as burdening the defendant
and third parties, promoting impracticality, and jeopardizing civil jury trial rights); Fallon, supra note 18, at 72 (arguing that in deciding whether to issue injunctive relief,
courts should employ a balancing "calculus more complex than employed by Lyons").
222. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
benefits of injunctive relief.
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ever, the court will need to assess the impact of an injunction on the
ability of hospital management to run the institution effectively.
Similarly, the court should weigh the financial burdens of the injunction on the hospital itself and on innocent third parties who use
hospital services. The court must also appraise whether the management can practically implement the injunctive order and
whether the court's own resources will be needed to monitor and enforce the decree. Is the defendant apt to resist compliance? Will the
court frequently be forced to reformulate its original order, to hold
compliance hearings, to appoint masters or other adjuncts, or to empanel juries to hear contempt charges?
Conversely, the court in Mills' case must consider that the relief requested may actually save infant and maternal lives and may
considerably diminish certain birth defects or injuries that may later
tax the health care system. The court must also take account of the
reality of handling numerous actions for wrongful death and personal injury, which would burden courts in the absence of an injunction. In determining the weight of this factor, the court must
reckon with the particular complexities of arriving at a meaningful
damage figure in such cases.2
The ultimate result of this balance should reflect carefully the
specific circumstances of the case, including the characteristics
identifying the defendant, the plaintiff, and other beneficiaries of
the injunction. Moreover, the court can find significant guidance in
the doctrine of equitable ripeness: inquiry into the timing and possibility of future injury helps to give significance to the various costs
and benefits of a particular injunction."
223. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 884 F.2d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 1989) (calculating
damages based on loss of infant and injury to the parent-child relationship); Morrissey v.
Welsh Co., 821 F.2d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1987) (asserting that computation of parents'
consortium damages for the loss of a child "must include the physical, emotional and psychological relationship between the parents and the child"); El-Meswari v. Washington
Gas Light Co., 785 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that damages for wrongful death
of infant include recovery for sorrow, mental anguish, and loss of consortium as well as
medical and burial expenses); Miller v. National Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 125,
127-28 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that dying infant's outward manifestations of suffering
warrant a jury award of damages to the parents for child's pain and suffering); Silverman
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 257, 261 (5th Cir. 1960) (explaining that although courts
recognize loss of child's companionship and grief of beneficiaries, no concrete estimate of
damages to parent for the death of a minor child is available); Barnes v. Robison, 712 F.
Supp. 873, 875 (D. Kan. 1989) (opining that "pecuniary losses to a parent from the loss of
a minor child ... are difficult to measure"); Hord v. National Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F.
Supp. 792, 794 (D.D.C. 1952) (positing that hospital's liability for wrongful death of newborn infant should be substantial, despite the fact that such damages are hard to measure), affd, 204 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
224. Inquiry into the extent of injury threatened-as opposed to whether the injury
is irreparable--can also be useful in weighing the costs and benefits of injunctive relief.
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Assume, for example, that the court finds the defendant hospital has no policy of discriminating against indigent obstetric patients and that Mills' injury was aberrational. The court may therefore conclude that the harm alleged in Mills' complaint is neither
probable nor imminent. Using this reasoning, the court may decide
that the possible savings in human life, future health care costs, and
damage suits (although significant if they actually happen) do not
to the court
outweigh the requested injunction's more certain costs
225
defendants.
individual
the
and
hospital,
system, the
3. Easing the Tension: Making Less of Prediction Problems.
Having separated equitable ripeness from irreparable injury and
integrated ripeness with the costs and benefits of injunctive relief, a
court does not avoid the difficult task of measuring the probability
and imminence of threatened harm. In fact, following the suggestions outlined above, a court actually magnifies the importance of
realistically predicting the threat of injury. 6
Obviously, there is no scientific answer to the problem of prediction in issuing injunctions. The practice among courts of insisting
on something close to certainty of harm suggests that prediction
problems act as a strong incentive for withholding injunctive relief.
Stymied by the lack of reliable formulae for dealing with uncertainty
of harm, courts apparently often prefer inaction to interventionparticularly in cases such as Sarah Mills where the institutional effects of intervention can be significant. 27
Courts are advised, however, not to overemphasize the difficulties of prediction in deciding whether to issue an injunction. Observations from legal tradition, modern remedial law, newly developed
equitable doctrine, and human nature all suggest that a court need
225. Cf. John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 525, 541-43 (1978) (advocating a similar model for preliminary injunctions).
226. Moreover, in the final injunction setting, prediction problems plague two planes
of the decisionmaking process: (1) determining the timing and nature of harm that may
occur if no injunction issues and (2) determining the costs and benefits that will follow if
an injunction does issue. Cf. id. at 541-42 (arguing that, in the preliminary injunction
context, the court should compare the possibility and degree of harm to the defendant
flowing from an improperly issued preliminary injunction with the possibility and degree
of harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is erroneously denied).
227. Professor Fiss attributes courts' trepidations about prediction with the subordination of injunctive relief to other remedies:
Insofar as the injunction seeks to prevent a future wrong, it requires the court
to make predictions about the future, and these judgments are widely assumed
to be treacherous, fraught with error. The question raised is whether the burden of prophesy justifies subordination of the injunction.
FISS, supra note 71, at 80. Fiss ultimately concludes, however, that prediction difficulties
cannot justify subordinating injunctive relief. Id. at 80-81.
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not withhold relief on the basis of prediction difficulties.
a. Legal Tradition. Our legal traditions have long reflected
satisfaction with probability: probable outcomes, probable results,
probable indicators, something far less than certainty." As.early as
1680, English case reports exhibit a marked tolerance for uncertainty of proof. The report of one assassination case maintains that
"the proof ought to be very great, to convict a man of such an offence;
but you must not expect it should be so clear, as in a matter of right
between man and man."2 m
Similarly in a 1680 libel dispute, the judge counsels the jury
that, for particular types of crimes, "we are fain to retreat to such
probable and conjectural Evidence as the matter will bear. " 2O
"[Elven for men's lives," the judge continues, "you have very often
not a direct proof of the fact, of the act, or of the actual killing; but
yet you have such evidence by presumption, as seems reasonable to
conscience." ' Accordingly, the judge admonishes:
You must take evidence in this case, as you do all the year long; that is, in
other cases, where you know there is an absolute certainty that the thing
is so: for human frailty must be allowed; that is, you may be mistaken. For
you do not swear, nor are you bound to swear here, that he was publisher
of this
book; but if you find him guilty, you only swear you believe it is
32
SO.

2

Later, in 1756, Sir Geoffrey Gilbert, in his treatise on evidence,
attempted to fashion a system for accommodating the uncertainty in
proof:
[Tihere are several degrees from perfect Certainty and Demonstration
quite down to improbability and Unlikeness, even to the Confines of Impossibility; and there are several Acts of the Mind proportioned to these
Degrees of Evidence, which may be called Degrees of Assent, from full Assurance and Confidence, quite down to Conjecture, Doubt, Distrust and

Disbelief.
228. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTHCENTURY ENGLAND 168-93 (1983) for a review of the role of probability in seventeenthcentury law.
229. The Trial of John Giles (1680), reprinted in 7 COBBETr'S COMPLETE COLLECTION
OF STATE TRIALS 1159 (T.B. Howell ed., London, R. Bagshaw 1810).
Even earlier, in 1665, Leibniz documented the role of probability in legal theory. See
IAN HACKING, THE EMERGENCE OF PROBABILITY 87 (1975). In fact, Leibniz used law as his
model for developing probability theory. See id. at 91.
230. The Trial of Henry Carr (1680), reprinted in 7 COBBETr'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1127 (T.B. Howell ed., London, R. Bagshaw 1810).
231. Id.

232. Id. at 1128; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 228, at 188-89 (describing an attitude
among legal thinkers at the time embracing conscience and moral assurances as appropriate touchstones for decisionmaking).
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Now what is to be done in all Trials of Right, is to range all Matters in the
Scale of Probability, so as to lay most Weight where the Cause ought to
preponderate, and thereby to make the most exact discernment that can
be, in Relation to the Right. s

Implicit in Sir Gilbert's formulation is not only tolerance for degrees
of probability, but also recognition that certain benefits may emanate from uncertainty. His analysis suggests that, by locating various offers of proof along a probability scale, a fact-finder may develop a more profound understanding of evidence than would
emerge if perfect certainty were sought.
A similarly positive attitude toward uncertainty is reflected in
modern law. Dean Pound, for example, argued that decisions made
without perfect information about the future are necessary fuel to
the development of the common law.' Similarly, rules allowing civil
judgments to rest on a "preponderance of the evidence" and rules
upholding prior administrative decisions absent an "arbitrary and
capricious" finding all testify to our belief that absolute certainty is
neither possible nor necessary in contemporary adjudications.
b. Uncertaintiesin Modern Remedial Law. One also encounters
tolerance of uncertainty in many areas of modern remedial law.
Take for example the task of calculating a plaintiff's lost income
resulting from injury. In such a case, one must grapple with such
problems as divining whether the plaintiff will remain in the occupation she held at the time of the accident, whether intervening
events in her personal life or in the industry where she works will
cause her to earn more or less than ordinarily expected, and
whether her working life expectancy will be greater or less than average. 5 When confronted with such complex damages issues, courts
do not evade the responsibility of fixing a damages figure and cope
with the prediction problems by allowing themselves considerable
latitude.2 6 No reason exists for foregoing this approach in handling
233. SiR GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 1-2 (1756), quoted in SHAPIRo,

supra note 228, at 181-82.

234. Roscoe Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, Address Before the Conference on the Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent (Feb. 17, 1940), in 14 U. CIN. L. REV.
324, 330-35 (1940).
235. See, e.g., Elmer J. Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of Damages, 19 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 719, 719-36 (1978) (describing complexities of forecasting an earnings
stream).
236. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946)

(concluding that where damages are hard to measure, fact-finders may make a just and
reasonable estimate based on relevant data); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment
Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1931) (asserting that fact-finders may determine the
amount of uncertain damages through a reasonable and probable estimate, as long as it is
established that defendant actually caused the damage); Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v.
Dworkin, 919 F.2d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 19901 (stating that the jury enjoys substantial dis-
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injunction requests with similarly difficult forecasting dilemmas.
A related point emerges from this discussion: since uncertainty
issues permeate remedial law,2- a court's decision to decline injunctive relief will not remove it from the realm of prophesy. Ironically,
the difficulty of translating the impact of a civil violation into money
damages is often cited as a ground for injunctive relief.2 31 Indeed, as
alluded to earlier, the uncertainty problems of approximating
plain23 9
tiff's rightful position are often avoided by injunctive relief.
c. Equitable Doctrine. Fear of erroneously issued injunctions
perhaps explains the strictness of equitable ripeness doctrine. 24 Injunctions are not only future-looking but are also a static response to
what is usually a dynamic problem.2 1 Courts may, therefore, perceive a significant risk of error in predicting the need for an injunction and may prefer not to intervene unless the plaintiff makes a
vigorous showing of probability and imminence of harm. Strong arguments, however, counsel against allowing this concern to overpower the decision whether to issue an injunction.
The consequences of an erroneously issued injunction may be
overstated. A court can err in issuing an injunction by incorrectly
evaluating the substantive legal standard applicable to the case, incorrectly interpreting the facts and circumstances surrounding the
cretion in awarding damages and "[w]hile the jury may not pull figures out of a hat", the
verdict does not fail if it is based on a rational calculation); Neyer v. United States, 845
F.2d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that when damages for personal injuries cannot be
precisely calculated, amount of damages is left to the fact-finder's discretion, which must
be exercised reasonably).
237. Criminal statutes as well as injunctions and damages in civil actions, contain
substantial predictive elements. FISS, supra note 71, at 80-81. See also Leubsdorf, supra
note 82, at 132 ("Daily, [judges and juries] grant remedies premised on informed guesses
about what will happen in the future, or about what would have happened but for the defendant's illegal acts.").
238. See, e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 82, at 345 (arguing that difficulty in measuring
damages is "common ground" for holding legal remedy inadequate); Developments, Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1002-04 (1965) (asserting that courts frequently grant
injunctions on the ground that damages would be "unascertainable").
239. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text for discussion of the uncertainties
of approximating with damages the position a plaintiff would have been in but for the defendant's wrong. See also FIss, supra note 71, at 81 (stating that the risk of error is
"notorious" in damage actions and criminal prosecutions, since such actions "call for the
reconstruction of a historical event, where the decisional agency did not 'experience' that
event); Leubsdorf, supra note 82, at 142 (asserting that injunctions avoid prediction
problems).
240. FISS, supra note 71, at 80-85 (suggesting that the difficulty of prophesying the
future explains in part the subordination of injunctions to other types of relief).
241. See Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (1986). Professor Jost explains
that injunctions can be problematic because they "attempt to bring all of the future into
the present and deal with it as though it were present." Id. at 1103 n.20.
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case, or incorrectly assessing the need to enjoin the defendant. In
the third situation, the court's error has limited significance. The
court may have rendered a substantively correct ruling about the
parties' rights, but simply miscalculated whether the defendant was
likely to engage in wrongful conduct. Under such circumstances, the
court did not incorrectly assert its power, but merely asserted its
power unnecessarily. 2 Possible attacks to such a decision are limited: one can criticize the decision only as a possible waste of judicial
resources2 3 or, perhaps, as a slur on the defendant's reputation for
lawfulness.
Where errors of fact and law are concerned, the situation is
more unsettling. Although legal and factual errors are not unique to
injunctive orders, the consequences of such errors are often exaggerated in the case of injunctions. Unlike damages, injunctions act
as direct restraints on conduct, fortified by the court's contempt
power. Because the collateral bar rule prohibits challenges to the
substance of an injunction in criminal contempt proceedings, 2" an
error in fact or law can bind a defendant's future conduct for quite
some time before being corrected by the issuing judge or on appeal.Y
A recent development may help mitigate this problem. The
United States Supreme Court has recently liberalized doctrine governing modifications of injunctive decrees, at least for injunctions
restructuring institutions such as school districts and prisons..2 46 At
one time, a court could modify the terms of an injunction only upon
"a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions."24 Recently, however, in the context of a consent decree
governing Boston's prison system, the Supreme Court announced
that a party is entitled to have the decree modified upon showing
merely "a significant change in circumstances." 2 "
Although the reach of this innovation beyond institutional reform litigation is uncertain, the new standard unquestionably pro242. FISS, supra note 71, at 81.
243. Id. at 81-82. The court's decision may not needlessly expend judicial resources if
it provides a necessary clarification of the law.
244. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967).
245. See FISS, supra note 71, at 82.
246. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1444-45 (1992) (school desegregation
litigation); Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992) (prison litigation); Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (school
desegregation litigation); see also Jost, supra note 241, at 1113-23 (documenting the shift
to a more flexible approach reflected in Supreme Court case law from 1932 to 1986).
247. United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
248. Rufo, 112 S.Ct. at 760. The Court further ruled that once the party meets this
standard, a court should consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored
to the changed circumstance. Id.
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vides more opportunity for defendants to persuade lower courts to
revise ill-considered decrees. Indeed, the new standard reflects an
attitude of allowing courts to alter decrees where the defendant can
show unintended or deleterious consequences of the injunction. 2 9
This allows courts to avoid long-term effects of prediction errors in
framing injunctive orders' 0 and should therefore diminish courts'
reluctance to issue injunctions.
d. Human Nature. Left to its own devices, the human mind is
generally risk averse, preferring the certainty of the status quo to
the uncertainty of change. Indeed, Hamlet tells us that the unknown
"puzzles the will, [a]nd makes us rather bear those ills we have
[t]hen fly to others that we know not of ...

" ' Cognitive

psycholo-

gists and game theorists have also long documented individuals'
preference for a certain outcome over a probable one, even wheremathematically speaking-the individual is more likely to benefit
from the probable outcome. 2 Moreover, the mind attributes far
greater weight to prospective harm than prospective gain, so that
individuals readily choose to forego probable gain in order to avoid
53
harm that is statistically far less probable.
Social science literature is replete with normative critiques of

249. The Rufo Court explained that a court ordinarily should not modify a consent
decree "where a party relies upon events that actually were anticipated at the time it entered into [the] decree." Id. (citations omitted). Where a party anticipated the events upon
which it relies in arguing for modification, the Court reasoned, "that party would have to
satisfy a heavy burden to convince a court that it agreed to the decree in good faith, made
a reasonable effort to comply with the decree, and should be relieved of its undertaking"
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Id. at 761.
250. Short-term effects that cannot be undone by modification may be dealt with in
the preliminary injunction stage through bonding procedures.
251. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 1, lines 80-82

(Phillip Edwards ed., 1985).
252. See, e.g., Robert P. Abelson & Ariel Levi, Decision Making and Decision Theory,
in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231, 276 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson
eds., 3d ed. 1985); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39
Ai. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341-43 (1984) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Choices] (citing
Daniel Bernoulli, Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk, 22
ECONOMETRICA 23-36 (1954) (Bernoulli's original work was published in 1738)); Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMfETRICA 263, 265-73 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory].
For a helpful discussion of this and related social science literature, see Marjorie A.
McDiarmid, Lawyer DecisionMaking: The Problem ofPrediction,1992 WISC. L. REV. 1847
(1992).
253. See, e.g., Abelson & Levi, supra note 252, at 276 (positing that the individual
may well reject a choice with a higher value over a choice with a lower value if latter is
"less uncertain"); Kahneman & Tversky, ProspectTheory, supra note 252, at 263 (arguing
that individuals underweight outcomes that are probable in comparison to outcomes that
are certain).

19931

STANDING AND EQUITABLE RIPENESS

991

this human predilection.m For the purposes of evaluating equitable
ripeness doctrine, however, the observations of Hamlet and the social scientists hold a different lesson.
At first blush, one might argue that respect for human risk
preferences provides equivocal guidance in formulating a ripeness
standard. On one hand, risk aversion suggests a rigid ripeness rule
because of the uncertainties surrounding the effects of injunctive relief. From this perspective, courts should tightly control injunctions
and withhold them often because we can never be certain of their effects. Alternatively, a flexible standard may be in order so that the
threat of probable harm to plaintiffs can be removed easily.
Upon further analysis, deference to risk preferences seems to
favor a more flexible ripeness approach. The concern of courts with
unintended or unforeseen effects of their rulings can be handled
with flexible modification principles such as those now evolving in
federal court case law. 5 Without standards allowing latitude in issuing injunctions, however, the law will provide plaintiffs with no
preventative protection from the threat of harm that has inspired
them to file suit. In terms of comparative risk, the latter seems
weightier for the human consciousness. This is particularly true for
plaintiffs like Lyons and Mills for whom prior experience may exacerbate the psychological burden posed by fear of future injury.
Empirical research, perhaps, is necessary to develop definite
principles for analyzing the risk choices inherent in the decision
whether to issue an injunction. Absent such guidance, however, respect for documented cognitive patterns suggests that the law
should embody deference to a plaintiff living under the threat of injury. The result-in close cases-will be for courts to resolve doubt
about threat of harm in favor of an injunction designed to protect
the plaintiff from that harm.
CONCLUSION

Difficulty in predicting the occurrence and effects of harm presents daunting problems for courts confronting injunction requests.
Similarly, federal courts are burdened with a formidable task in
balancing their responsibility to vindicate federal rights with limitations on their authority reflected in the structure of our constitutional scheme. Standing doctrine, such as that reflected in Lyons, is
a product of this troublesome balance. As it has played out in the
case law, however, the compromise at the core of this doctrine is in
fact no compromise at all: as a result of Lyons standing principles,
254. See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supranote 252; Kahneman & Tversky,
ProspectTheory, supra note 252.
255. See supranotes 246-50 and accompanying text for discussion of this case law.
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whole categories of federal law violations are insulated from federal
court review.
Reacting to this bald fact, this Article develops two proposals
for federal courts to incorporate into an evolving model for deciding
requests for permanent injunctions. First, inquiry into the effectiveness and appropriateness of a requested remedy has no place at the
doorstep of litigation. Accordingly, federal courts should analyze
threshold justiciability issues without reference to the type of relief
requested.
Second, after the parties have crystallized the facts and issues
in the case, the court is ready to confront whether the case actually
merits prospective relief. At this point, the court should not consider
equitable ripeness problems in a vacuum. Instead, the court should
weigh ripeness in tandem with other factors bearing on the propriety of an injunction, avoiding undue emphasis on the uncertainty
that threatened harm will occur.
Implementing these recommendations, federal courts will-I
believe-provide more effective, deterrent remedial solutions for
plaintiffs such as Sarah Mills and the many others like her.

